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RESTRICTED
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
PART 2 - THE ALLIED INVASION
INTRODUCTION
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declara tion of war against the United States by Germany and Italy brought
this country into the world conflict.
Immediate action was necessary to coordinate with our allies, and
especially with Great Britain, the strategy that would.govern the
future conduct of the war and the control that should be exercised
over it. In a report to the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, stated :
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the American
Chiefs of Staff . Out of the series of discussions which then followed
resulted an agreement not only regarding the immediate strategy
for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of a method for the strategical command and control of British and American military resources. Probably no other Allied action, in the field or otherwise, has exerted as powerful an effect on the con
duct of this war as the prompt establishment of a prescribed pro cedure for achieving unity of effort through the medium of the Com
bined Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction of the leaders of their respective governments.
At this first conference the President and the Prime Minister,
with the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, made the decision
that Allied resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany,
the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan.
In discussions following the conference a tentative target date
for an operation across the English Channel was set for the summer of 1943. Some consideration was given to the possibility of an emergency diversionary assault at a much earlier date if this became
necessary to save the situation on the Russian front. As further
studies were made, shortage of landing craft for launching a cross
Channel operation, and shortage of supplies for maintaining one,
militated against putting the plan into effect. At the same time,
the reverses suffered by the British in North Africa and the con
1

4
try against Gibraltar. Undoubtedly the Axis would occupy the
whole of France to forestall an Allied landing on the French Medi
terranean coast and to attempt to gain control of the French fleet at Toulon. The Germans would probably try to seize Tunis and
Bizerte in order to retain control of the Sicilian channel, an opera tion that would be relatively easy for them because of the short supply lines from their bases in Sicily and southern Italy. Last,
but not least, because of other commitments throughout the world
Allied planners were faced with a critical shortage of trained troops
and vital supplies and equipment, particularly landing craft and shipping, which would definitely limit the size of the operation.
Quoting from an official report :
Thus the strategic conception of sweeping the Axis from North Africa, and establishing Allied control from the Atlantic to the Red
Sea, necessitated an operation on a scale of such magnitude that,
once initiated, it would have to be followed through with all the force and shipping that the situation demanded. It would be the major Allied operation of 1942 and 1943.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
No clear picture of the military operations in French North Africa can be obtained without some understanding of the political events that accompanied, and sometimes even overshadowed, the military aspects of the campaign. In general, Frenchmen were divided into three groups :
1. General Charles de Gaulle, in London, was the rallying point
for the French National Committee. His group was also known as
the " Free French " and later as the " Fighting French . ” It comprised
French refugees who had escaped to England, America, or the
French colonies rather than accept German oppression at home and
those patriots who remained in France and took part in the activities
of the resistance groups. One of de Gaulle's followers, General
Leclerc, had organized a small force in French Equatorial Africa
that conducted raids against Italian outposts in the Fezzan (South
ern Libya ) and later crowned its activities with a campaign which
in thirty - nine days carried it 1600 miles from Fort Lamy, near Lake
Chad, to join with General Montgomery's Eighth Army at Tripoli
on 25 January 1943.
2. A second group, Frenchmen living in North Africa, where open resistance would have brought sudden German occupation, succeeded in establishing an underground " French Liberation Movement.”
Although the aim of this group, like the Free French, was to liberate

8
In addition to the naval escort forces, the Royal Navy would have
Force H, consisting of two battleships, four cruisers, two aircraft
carriers, and fifteen destroyers, to keep watch over the Italian and
Vichy French fleets in the Mediterranean.
As for air support, the initial assaults were to be supported by
carrier-based aircraft of the escort forces. The American Twelfth
Air Force was to form the Western Command, with headquarters
at Oran. One hundred and sixty fighters were to be flown from
Gibraltar to each of the Casablanca and Oran areas within three
days of the attack. Similarly the Royal Air Force squadrons were to
form the Eastern Command, with headquarters at Algiers. Ninety
of their planes were to arrive from Gibraltar by D plus 8.
An addition to the plan, developed early in October, provided for
the 2d Battalion of the American 503d Parachute Infantry to seize
the airfields of Tafaraoui and La Senia, south of Oran. This operaï؟¾tion would entail a flight from England of some twelve hours for
thirty-nine unarmed aircraft of the American 60th Troop-Carrier
Group.
In the endeavor to secure surprise, information as to the sites of
the proposed landings was, of course, carefully guarded. It was
realized that the Germans would probably learn that preparations
were being made for some kind of an operation; but even if they
should conclude that an amphibious assault was to be made someï؟¾where, it was hoped that in their thinking they would lean towards
Norway, western France, or Dakar. After the Central and Eastern
Task Forces had passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, the apparent
capabilities of the Allies would be more limited; but it was planned
that the convoy should, by the route followed, create the impression
it was headed for Malta or the Suez. During the hours of darkness
just preceding the landings, it would turn sharply to the south and
make for Algiers and Oran.
Allied Force Headquarters would remain at Gibraltar until adeï؟¾quate communications were established near Algiers. Because of
the amphibious nature of the operation, weather conditions would
have a most important bearing on its success. D-day was to be
8 November 1942.
THE LANDINGS, 8-11 November 1942 (Map 2)
By the afternoon of 7 November Operation Torch was ready to
be launched. The Western Task Force had successfully crossed
3,000 miles of submarine-infested ocean to arrive off its landing
area, and the Center and Eastern Task Forces were steaming past

9
Oran and Algiers toward “bomb alley,” where the Luftwaffe was
expectantly waiting to make the kill. In each of the three landing
areas the tactics were to be generally the same, landings on both
sides of each main objective as a means of subsequent encirclement.
At Oran and Algiers these were to be supplemented by frontal asï؟¾saults on the ports in order to seize shipping and harbor facilities
before they could be sabotaged.
Western Task Force.—French forces in Morocco, principally Seneï؟¾galese, Moroccan, and Algerian colonial troops, were located along
the Atlantic coast in the Casablanca area from Safi to Port Lyautey.
American forces were divided into three groups, as indicated on the
map. H-hour was to be at 0515, 8 November.
Landings were made at Fedala, fourteen miles to the northeast of
Casablanca, where the purpose was to initiate operations for the
capture of the latter-named city from the east; in the harbor of Safi,
125 miles to the southwest of Casablanca, where the immediate aim
was to land armor and to prevent reinforcements at Marrakech from
reaching Casablanca; and, finally, at Mehdia, seventy miles to the
northeast of Casablanca, where the object was to seize the Port
Lyautey airfields and protect the north flank of the entire operation.
All three landings achieved considerable surprise, and by 1015
hours Safi had been captured, following a successful rushing of the
harbor by two destroyers. At Fedala and Port Lyautey, however,
strong opposition was met, both from aircraft and from shore batï؟¾teries. The latter were silenced by naval gunfire, and by 1500 hours
Fedala had fallen. At Port Lyautey fierce fighting continued
throughout the day, but at nightfall the airfield was still in French
hands.
Meanwhile our naval forces off Casablanca had their share of
activity on 8 November. Early in the forenoon two French deï؟¾stroyer-leaders and five destroyers sortied and made as if to attack
our transports. They were taken under fire and forced to retire.
Shortly afterward the French light cruiser Primaguet joined the
destroyers outside the harbor. As it moved out again, the group
was promptly engaged by the Augusta and Brooklyn and vessels of
the covering force. With the exception of one vessel, which managed
to get back to the harbor, all French ships were either sunk or
beached. While it was assisting in this operation, the covering
force, consisting of the Massachusetts, Wichita, Tuscaloosa, and four
destroyers, was also exchanging fire with the shore batteries and
the French battleship Jean Bart, which was moored in the harbor.
In order to end this distressing bloodshed, several attempts were

10
made by American officers to contact the French authorities in Casaï؟¾blanca for the arrangement of an armistice, but Admiral Michelier
refused to receive them.
Fighting continued throughout the next two days. The American
forces steadily enlarged their beachheads and unloaded equipment
despite a heavy surf which took toll of the landing craft. On 10
November the airfield at Port Lyautey was captured, the first Amerï؟¾ican planes landing on the field at 1100 hours. This completed the
primary mission of the Mehdia force.
In the south, after the capture of Safi on 8 November, elements
of the 2d Armored Division moved eastward to intercept French
reinforcements that were advancing from Marrakech to Casablanca.
These French forces were dispersed on the 10th, and that night the
armor began the march to Casablanca. The 47th Regimental Comï؟¾bat Team remained at Safi to protect the port. When the armored
force received word of the surrender on 11 November, General Harï؟¾mon had obtained the surrender of Mazagan and was continuing
the advance to Casablanca, fifty miles to the north.
The 3d Division troops advancing on Casablanca from Fedala
were held up by stiff resistance, but by the afternoon of the 10th
they had reached an assembly area northeast of Casablanca. That
night they made an encircling movement to the southeast in preparaï؟¾tion for a concerted attack on the city at 0730 hours, 11 November,
but at 0700 the French, acting upon orders from Admiral Darlan,
capitulated.
Center Task Force.—Changing course abruptly during the night,
the Center Task Force arrived off Oran and began its landings at
Arzeu and Les Andalouses at 0135 hours on 8 November. The initial
objectives were airports and the highway system paralleling the
coast. The French commander of the area, after deciding to coï؟¾operate with the American forces, changed his mind and ordered
full resistance. Landing barges were fired on, and some were sunk
as they neared the shore, but the landings were carried out at all
points that had been selected.
A Ranger battalion captured Arzeu, about thirty miles northeast
of Oran, and shortly afterward Allied supply ships commenced unï؟¾loading cargo. Several miles east of Arzeu, Combat Command B,
1st Armored Division, landed and moved southwest to seize the airï؟¾fields at Tafaraoui and La Senia. The 16th and 18th Regimental
Combat Teams from the 1st Infantry Division were brought ashore
near Arzeu and started an advance toward Oran.

11
To the west the 26th Regimental Combat, Team (1st Infantry
Division) landed at Les Andalouses and struck eastward toward
Oran under orders to seize the dominating heights west of the city.
An armored detachment came ashore northwest of Lourmel and
moved to take the airfield at that place.
In an attempted frontal assault, two cutters carrying two comï؟¾panies of American troops and special antisabotage parties broke
through the booms and dashed into the harbor of Oran. Here they
came under an overwhelming fire from shore batteries and French
warcraft. They reached their objective, but were set ablaze and
disabled. Most of the crews and the troops aboard became casualï؟¾ties; the survivors were captured.
Initially the only other serious opposition to these operations came
from a coastal battery above Arzeu, but resistance developed apace
during the day as our troops began to advance on Oran.
By nightfall of the 8th, Combat Command B had captured the
airfield at Tafaraoui and had moved northward toward La Senia.
The 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams had advanced a disï؟¾tance of eighteen miles from Arzeu, meeting increasing resistance
as they neared Oran. The 26th Regimental Combat Team from Les
Andalouses had moved eastward to the vicinity of Oran after overï؟¾coming some opposition. The airfield at Lourmel had been occupied.
The plans for the paratroop mission went largely astray. The
formation became partially scattered by a storm, and those planes
that did get through landed at widely separated points on the Sebkra,
a dried-up salt marsh. About 300 paratroopers were finally assemï؟¾bled in the vicinity of Tafaraoui, where they ably assisted the ground
troops in securing that airfield.
During 9 November enemy resistance continued to slow the adï؟¾vance at almost all points. La Senia airfield held out until after dark.
However, Tafaraoui airfield, which had fallen on the 8th, was being
used by aircraft from the Twelfth Air Force as the build-up of the
forces ashore continued.
Early on the 10th the converging infantry colums were in position
around the outskirts of Oran, and elements of the armored combat
command were close to the southern edge of the city. Following a
coordinated attack by all units at 0737 hours, the armored troops
penetrated into the city, and at 1230 General Fredendall received
the formal capitulation of the French commander.
Eastern Task Force.—As events developed, the Algiers area, the
most important of the three major objectives, proved to be the easiest
to secure. The sea was calm, and surprise was achieved. There

12
was some opposition from naval and coast-defense guns, which conï؟¾tinued to fire until silenced by Allied naval and air units, but for the
most part the landings were unopposed.
As had the other two forces, the Eastern Task Force arrived off
its objective on schedule during the night of 7-8 November, and landï؟¾ings proceeded at three beaches. West of Algiers the 168th Regiï؟¾mental Combat Team made the initial landing at Cape Ferruch.
Friendly French officers, who were prepared to cooperate with the
American forces, surrendered Fort Sidi Ferruch at 0300 hours withï؟¾out firing a shot. Armored cars and tanks were landed, and the
advance eastward toward Algiers commenced. Three miles from
the city some opposition from Vichy sympathizers was encountered,
but by early afternoon the Americans were able to continue their
movement toward the city.
Meanwhile a landing was made near Castiglione by British Comï؟¾mando troops, who advanced southward and quickly occupied the
airfield at Blida. Soon fighters from the British naval air force
arrived and began to use the airfield. The Commandos then moved
eastward to cut off the city of Algiers from land communication to
the southwest.
While the landings west of Algiers were being accomplished, the
American 39th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced by a battalion
of British Commandos, landed on beaches near Ain Taya, fifteen
miles east of the city. One column immediately headed for the chief
objective, the big Maison Blanche airdrome, while another moved
on Algiers. The airdrome was taken at 0830 hours, after some slight
resistance was overcome at Fort de l’Eau and after a brush with
French tanks near the airfield. A little later a squadron of Hurriï؟¾canes, which had left Gibraltar at dawn, landed safely.
In the meantime, as at Oran, a direct attack on the harbor to gain
control of harbor equipment and prevent sabotage met with violent
opposition. Two British destroyers and two American coastal loadï؟¾ers were severly damaged, and although a few Commandos were put
ashore, the attempt to take Algiers by frontal assault failed.
By the afternoon of the 8th the converging American columns had
completed the encirclement of Algiers and the rail, highway, and air
communications were in Allied hands. During the day the task force
commander, Major General Charles W. Ryder, went ashore to confer
with a representative of Admiral Darlan. They reached an agreeï؟¾ment that all resistance should cease and that our forces should
occupy the city at 1900 hours, 8 November.
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13
COMMENTS
The surrender of Casablanca ended the initial (landing) phase of
the operations. Months of preparation and three days of fighting
had placed almost all French North Africa in Allied hands. Amerï؟¾ican casualties totaled about 770 killed or missing and 1050 wounded.
The British lost 240 killed or missing and sixty wounded.
Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the operation
was the organization of a combined force of American and British
ground, air, and naval forces under one combined staff and the moveï؟¾ment of this force thousands of miles to make simultaneous combat
landings at widely separated points on a hostile shore. The landings,
involving over 100,000 troops, hundreds of airplanes, and 258 ships
and war vessels, had truly written a new chapter in amphibious
warfare.
The political aspects of the landings, particularly the recognition
of Darlan, became a subject of much discussion. The comments of
General Marshall in an official report are most pertinent:
General Eisenhower had announced that General Giraud would
be responsible for civil and military affairs in North Africa, but
the French military officials on the ground were found to be loyal
to Marshal Petain’s government. President Roosevelt’s note to the
French Chief of State had assured Marshal Petain of our desire for
a liberated France, but the Vichy answer was disappointing. Our
ambassador was handed his passport on 9 November, and orders
were dis*****ed from Vichy to French African units to resist our
forces, which by then had already accomplished their missions exï؟¾cept on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Petain’s designated sucï؟¾cessor and commander in chief of all French forces, was found to be
in Algiers. ... He was taken into protective custody, and when it
was found that the French leaders stood loyal to the Vichy governï؟¾ment, a series of conferences immediately followed with the purpose
of calling a halt to the French resistance against General Patton’s
task force in the vicinity of Casablanca. When, on the morning of
11 November, the Germans invaded unoccupied France, Admiral
Darlan rejected the pseudo-independent Vichy government, assumed
authority in North Africa in the name of Marshal Petain, and proï؟¾mulgated an order to all French commanders in North Africa to
cease hostilities. This order reached Casablanca a few minutes beï؟¾fore the final American assault was to be launched on the early
morning of 11 November.
These events, which transpired subsequent to the actual landings
on 8 November, required quick decisions, and the results finally
achieved fully vindicated the American military leaders. Throughï؟¾out the North African campaign the problem of welding the French
into a united and cooperative ally was a heavy burden which fell to

14
General Eisenhower in addition to his purely military duties. The
gist of the commitment signed by Admiral Darlan was that the
French were to give the Allies immediately as much active assistance
in the seizure of Tunisia as lay within their powers. They were to
organize the government of North Africa, under Darlan, for effecï؟¾tive cooperation and, under General Giraud’s leadership, were to
begin the reorganization of selected military forces for active parï؟¾ticipation in the fighting. The way was now paved toward attaining
the principal objective, the occupation of Tunisia and the annihilaï؟¾tion of German forces in Africa.
The principal factors that contributed to the success of the landï؟¾ings in French North Africa were: (1) strategic surprise, (2) lack
of organized French resistance, and (3) effective joint militaryï؟¾naval planning and execution. Errors were made in the execution
of the plans, but these were to be expected from green troops. The
experience was to serve them in good stead in the future.
By the end of November there had been a definite turning point
in the Allied military situation as a whole. General Montgomery
had commenced the pursuit of the remnants of Rommel’s army
across Egypt and Libya, the Americans and British had landed
successfully in French North Africa and had started the invasion
of Tunisia, and the Russians had begun their winter offensive at
Stalingrad. All of these offensive steps gathered momentum with
each passing month. The initiative had passed to the Allies, and
for the first time during the war the German military situation had
deteriorated to an enforced strategic defensive. The tide*had likeï؟¾wise turned in the Pacific. Americans had invaded the Solomons
at Guadalcanal and had secured the lifeline to Australia. The Japï؟¾anese were being forced from southeastern New Guinea, and the
Allies had started on the long road back to the Philippines.
TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN
The conclusion of the landing phase paved the way for the next
operation, the Tunisian campaign (Map 3). This campaign, which
was to last six months, will be divided into three phases. The first
will cover the race between the Allies and the Axis to build up a
force in the Bizerte-Tunis area strong enough to deny the loser this
key terrain. The Germans were to win this race by a narrow marï؟¾gin. The second phase will comprise the period of Axis initiative,
during which time the Germans were to develop and expand a strong
perimeter defense around their holdings in Tunisia. The third phase

15
will include the decisive period of the campaign: the Allied victory
at Mareth, the capture of Bizerte and Tunis, and the subsequent
surrender of all Axis forces in North Africa.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Over its whole length and breadth Tunisia varies greatly both in
terrain and climate. Five hundred miles long from north to south
and 150 miles wide from east to west, its surface consists of a conï؟¾fused mountainous zone in the north, an area of lower plateaus in
the center, and broad plains in the south gradually merging into the
sands of the Sahara Desert.
The mountains in the north are the eastern extremity of that chain
of the Atlas Mountains that begins in southern Morocco and runs
entirely across French North Africa in a northeasterly direction.
They are rocky and steep and near Souk Ahras reach an altitude of
over 4200 feet.
The extreme eastern spurs of these mountains, known as the
Grand Dorsal, extend to the south of Tunis in the shape of an inï؟¾verted “V”. From the apex of the “V”, near Pont du Fahs, the
eastern arm, called the Eastern Dorsal, runs south 125 miles to Makï؟¾nassy, thence southwest to the vicinity of El Guettar. Crossed by
few passes—Fondouk, Faid, Maknassy, and El Guettar—this Eastï؟¾ern Dorsal would, with Chott Djerid (a large salt lake), provide a
natural defense of the Allied right flank against any attacker from
the east or south. This terrain was to be the scene of much bitter
fighting during the Tunisian campaign.
The western arm of the “V”, the Western Dorsal, extends southï؟¾west from Pont du Fahs and forms a secondary barrier against
attack from the east or south. The important passes through this
range are Maktar, Sbiba, Kasserine, Dernia, and El Abiod. Tebessa,
on the western slope of the dorsal, is an important communications
center and a key to the southern front.
In the north the Medjerda River, the most important stream, winds
northeast from the mountains to the Gulf of Tunis. Medjez el Bab
is the key to this corridor to Tunis. It was to become an important
defensive position covering Allied lines of communication to the west.
There are few good roads in Tunisia. The main roads are usually
hard-surfaced (tarred) but narrow. Secondary roads are sometimes
well metalled, but more often are little more than dirt tracks. After
a few hours of rain many so-called roads become practically impassï؟¾able for motor transport, while in prolonged dry weather they deï؟¾teriorate rapidly. Where they pass through the hills, the roads often
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16
become defiles for long distances. During military operations they
can be blocked with mine fields and covered by fire from the high
ground commanding them oh either side. Thus the defiles and passes
were to become important objectives during the Tunisian campaign.
There are three routes of entry into Tunisia from Algeria. First
is the coast road through Bone. Another route, through Souk Ahras,
some forty miles inland, leads to the Tunis-Bizerte area either
by way of Souk el Arba or by the more southerly road through Le
Kef. Access to central and southern Tunisia is through Tebessa,
from which point roads lead northeastward to Medjez el Bab and
Tunis, eastward through Kasserine to the passes at Fondouk and
Faid, and southeastward through Gafsa to Sfax and Gabes.
The railroads are of especial importance in this region of few
good highways. However, the deterioration of the roadbeds and
the French rolling stock was to make even this form of transportaï؟¾tion extremely unreliable. Operating in the level coastal plains of
Tunis and southern Tunisia, the enemy was to have the definite
advantage of shorter and better communications.
The period of heaviest rains begins in late November and continues
through February. During this season the lowlands, particularly,
become a glutinous sea of mud.
THE RACE FOR TUNISIA, November-December 1942
Having secured the initial objectives of Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers, the Allies turned immediately to the next phase, the concenï؟¾tration of the bulk of American and French Moroccan and Algerian
forces in the Casablanca-Oran area and the advance of the British
First Army to Tunisia. According to General Eisenhower:
Our chief hope of anticipating the Axis in Tunisia lay in our actï؟¾ing with utmost speed. Indeed, we were involved in a race not only
against the building up of enemy forces at Tunis and Bizerte, but
against the weather as well. There was less than a month of fair
weather ahead, and Axis air and ground forces were within easy
striking distance of Tunis and Bizerte, less than 100 miles away
from these places across the Sicilian narrows. All the same, our
easternmost force was at Algiers, 560 miles west of Tunis. Necesï؟¾sarily, therefore, we had to rely on a rapid advance of very light
forces, understrength in both personnel and equipment.
To make matters worse, the enemy lost no time in meeting the
Allied invasion. On 9 November German air transports began flyï؟¾ing troops into the Bizerte-Tunis area. Here again the French
reaction exasperated the Allies. Admiral Esteva, the French Resiï؟¾dent, listened to Vichy and, despite Darlan’s armistice directive, preï؟¾Digitized byGoogle

17
pared the way for the German entry. French troops under General
Barre, who was pro-Ally, were ordered out of Tunis, and the city
was left defenseless. Later General Barre’s forces joined the Allies,
but in the meantime the Germans found airfield and dock facilities
ready for their use.
On 9 November General Anderson arrived at Algiers to take over
command of the British First Army. His plan was to seize all ports
and airfields to the east (Bougie, Djidjelli, Philippeville, Bone, and
La Calle) as rapidly as possible and then to rush his forces forward
by motor transport, landing craft, and troop-carrying aircraft. The
port of Bougie and the airfield at Djidjelli were the first objectives.
The floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British
78th Division, was still aboard ships at Algiers. It sailed on the
evening of 10 November to take the first objectives of the eastward
drive. The capture of Bougie on 11 November was unopposed, but
because of bad surf conditions the force was unable to take the Djidï؟¾jelli airfield until the 13th. During this interim lack of adequate
land-based air cover permitted the Germans to bomb Bougie harbor,
where they damaged a British aircraft carrier.
Bone was occupied on 12 November by two companies of a British
parachute battalion dropped from C-47’s of the American 65th Carï؟¾rier Command and a British Commando battalion brought in by
water. The only Axis opposition to this move was a heavy raid on
the airfield that night. The build-up of troops in the Bone area conï؟¾tinued as rapidly as possible, air, sea, rail, and vehicular transporï؟¾tation being utilized. The advance to the east was pressed, and by
15 November leading elements of the 36th Brigade of the 78th Diviï؟¾sion had occupied Tabarka, only eighty miles from Tunis. A British
paratroop battalion which had been dropped at Souk el Arba on the
16th had moved beyond Beja by the 17th, and the troops at Tabarka
had advanced to Djebel Abiod.
At the same time the Allies were securing airfields to the south.
On 15 November Colonel Edson D. Raff’s 503d Parachute Battalion,
an American unit, dropped at Youks les Bains and two days later
occupied the Gafsa airfield, far to the south. It sent patrols over
the entire southern area, meeting only small Italian forces. Raff
Force, as it came to be known, established cordial relations with
the French garrison at Tebessa, which promptly began cooperating
with the Americans in patrolling the area.
Evidence of French cooperation appeared on 16 November, when
reports were received of French and German patrols clashing in the
Beja-Debjel Abiod-Mateur area. Although General Barre had been
negotiating with the Germans since their arrival, the advance of the

18
Allies into Tunisia had won the support of the French forces, and
Barre now agreed that his troops would cover the concentration of
the 78th Division in the Tabarka-Souk el Arba area. On 17 Novemï؟¾ber General Anderson issued orders to the 78th to complete its conï؟¾centration and prepare for an advance on Tunis.
About this time the Axis fighting strength was estimated at 500
to 1000 in the Tunis area and about 4000 at Bizerte, with some tanks
and aircraft at each place. At the same time JU-52,
s were averaging
more than fifty landings a day at Bizerte. The enemy had occupied
Mateur and had pushed out west and south.
The Allied expeditionary force that had rushed into Tunisia was
formed principally of two brigades of the British 78th Infantry Diï؟¾vision and one battalion of the 17th Lancers, reinforced by light
tanks from the American 1st Armored Division. It was realized
that such a small force, only a few thousand men in all, could not
hope to take Tunis and Bizerte if the Germans succeeded in bringing
in heavy reinforcements. Yet at the time it was the largest force
that could be supplied over the long and difficult line of communicaï؟¾tion.
Follow-up convoys arrived at Bone as rapidly as possible, and as
soon as transportation was unloaded, the newly arrived elements of
the British First Army continued overland to the east (Map 4a). By
20 November British armor, known as Blade Force, was established
in the Souk el Arba area, and by 22 November the 11th Brigade
Group * of the 78th Division was concentrated in the Beja area.
Operations in the north were now to take place along three clearly
defined axes: (1) the road from Tabarka to Mateur, (2) the Bejaï؟¾Mateur road, and (3) the main highway running from Beja through
Medjez el Bab and Tebourba to Tunis.
While the Allies were desperately trying to build up their advance
units and bring up supplies, the enemy seized the initiative by atï؟¾tacking the French at Medjez el Bab on 18 and 19 November. The
ill-equipped French were assailed three times by infantry supported
by artillery, tanks, and dive bombers, which inflicted casualties of
25 per cent on the defenders. The French retired until reinforced
by British and American armor and artillery, when they counterï؟¾attacked. At the same time another Axis attack at Djebel Abiod
was stopped by the leading battalion of the 36th Brigade.
Although the British had been able to hold the enemy in check,
they were themselves unable to advance, and were ordered to delay
temporarily until their strength was sufficient to insure a reasonable
* A British brigade group is similar to our regimental combat team.

19
chance of success in the drive to Tunis. Also, the intermixture of
French and British units that had occurred as a result of improvisaï؟¾tion following the French decision to act with the Allies had to be
straightened out. By 23 November a verbal agreement had been
reached whereby all troops north of the line Le Kef-Zaghouan
should be under command of the British First Army, while all units
south of that line should be subject to French command. This was
unsatisfactory, but it was the best that could be achieved at the
moment, since the French had refused to serve under a British
commander.
On 24 November General Anderson had completed the forward
concentration of the 78th Division and Blade Force, with the British
6th Armored Division en route to Teboursouk and Combat Comï؟¾mand B of the American 1st Armored Division en route to Souk el
Arba as follow-up troops. The advance was resumed, Blade Force
penetrating the enemy outpost position to a point midway between
Tebourba and Mateur and the 11th Brigade, on the right, advancing
down the Medjerda valley, where it captured Medjez el Bab on the
25th. Progress was steady for the next three days, with the 11th
Brigade, reinforced by American and British armor, moving astride
the river to take Tebourba the night of 26-27 November. On 28 Noï؟¾vember our forces reached Djedeida, less than sixteen miles from
Tunis. This proved to be the farthest advance toward Tunis until
the final drive of the campaign, six months later.
To the north the 36th Brigade, although advancing about ten
miles toward Mateur, met increasing resistance from enemy mings
and booby traps. At the same time Blade Force, in the plains south
of Mateur, began to meet supply difficulties, which were aggravated
by the first rains. In all sections the enemy’s dive bombers were an
important factor in stopping our advance, since our airfields were
too far to the rear to provide the necessary cover.
The forward positions were held until 1 December, when von Arï؟¾nim, the German commander, launched an attack with dive bombers,
tanks, and infantry against Blade Force near Tebourba. After losï؟¾ing forty tanks, Blade Force was withdrawn, and the sector was
taken over by Combat Command B and the 11th Brigade. On 3
December the enemy attacked again, the 11th Brigade suffering
heavily both in men and equipment. By this time several battalions
of the 78th Division had less than 350 men.
On 8 December General Eisenhower approved General Anderson’s
proposal to withdraw his forces to more defensible ground. Howï؟¾ever, the important center of Medjez el Bab was to be held at all
costs. The weather proved a serious handicap to this withdrawal.

20
Combat Command B became badly mired and was finally forced to
abandon the larger part of its equipment, retrieving only three of
its eighteen 105-mm. howitzers, twelve of its sixty-two medium
tanks, and thirty-eight of its 122 light tanks. This was a serious
loss, since the continual fighting and serious attrition, together with
the inadequate rail and highway communications, had hindered the
build-up of reserves. The weather was turning our few available
airfields into quagmires while the Axis planes, operating from paved
fields, maintained air supremacy over the forward areas, compoundï؟¾ing the confusion and handicaps confronting the Allies. It was
estimated that on 30 November the Germans had 15,500 combat
troops, 130 tanks, sixty field guns, and thirty antitank guns in the
Tunis-Bizerte area. By 18 December this force had grown to a total
of 42,000 men, of whom about 25,000 were Germans, and reinforceï؟¾ments were still arriving.
During November and early December southern Tunisia was alï؟¾most a no man's land, but several hundred Germans arrived in Gabes,
Sfax, and Sousse by troop-carrier planes and garrisoned those towns.
Enemy patrols of armored cars and light tanks pressed westward
and occupied Pont du Fahs.
Farther .south the American paratroops, who had dropped at Youks
les Bains and had joined with French forces in that area, patrolled
actively. The mission of the few hundred American and French
troops in central and southern Tunisia was to make the enemy beï؟¾lieve that they were a whole division. They rushed up and down
their hundred-mile front, appearing here and there to threaten the
Germans along the coast. They fought numerous skirmishes with
enemy patrols and effectively protected the southern flank of the
First Army.
Unwilling to give up the race for Tunisia, General Eisenhower
decided to launch another attack in the north about 20 December
with Tunis as the objective. But the weather continued to be a most
formidable enemy. Vehicular movement off paved roads was imï؟¾possible, and two thirds of the Allied aircraft at the principal field,
at Souk el Arba, were inoperative because of mud. The supply lines
were inadequate to meet the needs for steel matting and equipment
to place the airfields in condition or, for that matter, to provide
the required build-up of general supplies, particularly ammunition.
Since the Allied hope in this last planned offensive lay in air power
and artillery, the operation was postponed and then, on 24 Decemï؟¾ber, finally abandoned.

21
General Eisenhower has expressed his feelings on the situation
in these words:
The abandonment of our immediate offensive plans was the bitï؟¾terest disappointment that I had yet suffered, but I was convinced
that to attempt a major attack under prevailing conditions in
northern Tunisia would be merely to court disaster. We could not
hope to resume major operations in the north until the middle of
March, and we had to set about the slow business of building up
for an attack at the end of that period. The logistic marathon,
which I had desperately tried to avoid, had begun.
During these last two months of 1942 other events which had some
bearing on the military situation were transpiring. When the Gerï؟¾mans moved into unoccupied France and toward the naval base at
Toulon on 11 November, Admiral Darlan ordered the French fleet
to sail for Africa. But in the confusion of the situation the fleet was
scuttled instead, only a few submarines getting through to North
Africa. Darlan was more successful in his next attempt to aid the
Allies. He was able to persuade M. Boisson, the governor of French
West Africa, to join the Liberation Movement and to open Dakar
for use as an Allied base. When Admiral Darlan was assassinated
on 24 December, General Giraud took his place. General Juin beï؟¾came the commander of the French military forces. ,
At this time the bulk of the American forces (the Fifth Army*),
along with two divisions of French troops from Morocco and the
French division in Oran, were being held in the Casablanca-Oran
area to guard communications, to counter any drive the Germans
might make through Spanish Morocco, and to conduct training in
preparation for future missions.
Comments.—The Allied move to seize Tunisia was a necessary
step in the continuation of the strategic offensive in North Africa.
Axis efforts to thwart the attempt were an equally essential step in
carrying out the strategic defensive to which they had been reduced
by their defeat in the Battle of El Alamein.
Two main reasons impelled the Axis command to an all-out defense
of Tunisia. The first was that only by holding that area could they
hope to extricate the troops and equipment of Rommel’s army from
their serious predicament. The second was that it was imperative
to delay the Allied attack against Europe for as long a period as
possible in order to gain time to prepare the necessary defenses.
* The Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark commanding, was actiï؟¾vated on 6 January 1943. Its headquarters was at Oujda, Morocco. The troops
assigned included the 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored
Division.

22
Allied strategy in North Africa ceased to be a mystery to the Ger￾mans the moment they were advised that the landings had taken
place, and from that time on the element of strategic surprise ceased
to weigh against them. Surprise had contributed greatly to the
success of the initial operations, but was lacking entirely during
the early period of the Allied thrust into Tunisia.
In this connection it is interesting to note the reply of a high￾ranking German officer, Field Marshal Kesselring, to an American
interrogation in May 1946. Kesselring was asked what intelligence
the Germans had of our landings in North Africa. He replied:
We were, in fact, in possession of very exact information con￾cerning activity in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and were already
fully prepared for a possible landing. I myself was the only person
who believed in the possibility of a landing in Algiers. The German
and Italian high command, however, did not share this view. Your
radio broadcast service functioned faultlessly in this respect. It
kept us constantly in a state of excitement and carried on an ad￾mirable form of nerve war, so that we were forced to expect some
sort of invasion at any time and yet did not know from which direc￾tion it was to be expected.
Once the facts were appraised by the Germans, they acted with
speed and efficiency. In so doing they won the race for Tunisia,
succeeded in postponing the invasion of Italy for six months, and
gained time in which to strengthen their Continental defenses. But
we shall see later what price they paid for this.
The Allied command recognized the strategic importance of Tu￾nisia. From the very beginning it was known that once Tunis and
Bizerte were captured, all Tunisia would fall. We have seen why
initial landing points farther to the east than Algiers were not
selected. There remain then only two questions to be answered:
(1) Why was only a small force sent to Tunisia? (2) Why was it
unable to win the race to Tunis? Both questions have the same
answer: the lack of supply facilities for larger forces either on the
ground or in the air. Handicapped by lack of transport and slowed
by long supply routes, the Allied commander could send only a small
combat force into Tunisia. When this force was stopped and then
driven back by the enemy, it became necessary to enter the “logistical
marathon” referred to by. General Eisenhower.
PERIOD OF AXIS INITIATIVE-, January-March 1943
Allied Plans and Build-up (Map 4b).—In early January the Tuni￾sian front extended from the Chott Djerid in the south to the Medi￾terranean in the north, a distance of some 250 miles. Through the
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23
Sahara, south of the area shown on the map, roamed small patrols
of the French Camel Corps. The American paratroops held the
desert and wasteland area around Gafsa and up to Faid Pass. Eleï؟¾ments of the American 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions were
beginning to arrive in this area.
Around Pichon and Fondouk and farther north the French XIX
Corps held positions in the hills and controlled the Ousseltia valley.*
These forces were lightly armed with obsolete weapons and had
neither the transport nor the administrative machinery for offensive
operations. But under the able leadership of Generals Juin and
Koeltz they maintained high morale, and by the end of the campaign
cooperation with the other Allies was excellent.
The remainder of the front, north to the sea at Cape Serrat, was
held by the British First Army, as yet an army in name only. At
this time it consisted of only the V Corps, which was composed of
the 6th Armored and the 78th Infantry Divisions and the 139th
Brigade. Thus during early January a front of 250 miles was held
by the *****alent of three British, part of one American, and three
weak French divisions.
To oppose the Allies at this time, General von Arnim appears to
have had three German and three Italian divisions. In approxiï؟¾mately two months he had expanded the beachheads of Sousse, Sfax,
and Gabes into a more or less continuous coastal corridor in order
to insure communication and close cooperation between his own
forces and those of Rommel, then approaching the Mareth position.
With the abandonment for the time being of offensive plans in the
north, the situation on the long stretch of front from Pont du Fahs
to Gafsa deserved close attention. A successful Axis attack through
our weakly held positions there could carry through to the Mediterï؟¾ranean coast in the Bone area and completely isolate the British
First Army. As a coimterplan the Allies developed the “Sfax
Project/’ a plan for an Allied offensive against Gabes and Sfax which
would be mounted in the Tebessa-Kasserine area. Besides regainï؟¾ing the initiative, this operation, if successful, would interrupt the
line of communication between Rommel and von Arnim and secure
the south flank of the British First Army. The prospects of better
weather in this area were encouraging, but it would be difficult to
find the troops for the operation and more difficult to supply them.
* Commanded by General Koeltz, this corps contained most of the available
French forces from Tunisia and Algeria—about three divisions that consisted
mostly of native troops.
As previously stated, General Juin had command of all the French forces.

24
On 1 January 1943 the American II Corps, Major General Fredenï؟¾dall commanding, was detached from the Center Task Force at Oran
and sent to Tunisia. The II Corps, which had as a nucleus the
American 1st Armored Division, completed its concentration in the
Kasserine-Tebessa area on 15 January and proceeded with plans
for the attack to be launched on the 23d. However, information
was received on 15 January that it would be impossible to coordinate
this attack with the advance of General Montgomery’s army, since
Montgomery would not reach Tripoli until the last week in January.
This caused General Eisenhower to abandon the Sfax offensive altoï؟¾gether, it now being considered too risky. After this change of plan
the 1st Infantry Division, less the 18th and 26th Regimental Combat
Teams, was attached to the French XIX Corps, farther north.
The approach of the British Eighth Army made it necessary to
plan an extensive reorganization to achieve unity of command in
the Allied land, sea, and air forces. At the Casablanca conference
in mid-January President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and
the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that such a reorganization
should take place when the campaign had reached the proper stage
and when the necessary preparations had been completed. General
Eisenhower was placed in command of the new North African Theï؟¾ater of Operations and relieved of responsibility for the European
Theater. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British commanï؟¾der in chief in the Middle East, was to become Eisenhower’s deputy
and was to command the Eighteenth Army Group, consisting of the
British First and Eighth Armies, the American II Corps, and the
French troops on the Tunisian front. Air units were to be organized
into the Mediterranean Air Command, under Air Chief Marshal Sir
Arthur Tedder. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was to become
naval commander in chief in the Mediterranean. As we shall see,
it was to be another month before these arrangements could be put
into effect.
By late January von Arnim’s army of 65,000 was receiving about
750 men per day and large quantities of supplies. Therefore, to
build up the Allied forces and to interdict the enemy’s build-up beï؟¾came the guiding and virtually the sole aim of Allied strategy in
Tunisia. Steps were taken to improve the Allied supply setup and
to develop air strength over Tunisia.
All port and transportation facilities were geared to maximum
capacity (Map 3). The First Army was based at Bone and used the
supply roads through La Calle and Souk Ahras. The supplies for
the American II Corps were moved from Oran and Algiers by rail
to the new Eastern Base Section depots at Constantine and from

25
there to advanced supply points in the vicinity of Tebessa. The
American Twelfth Air Force was supplied by rail and road from
Philippeville.
Air and naval forces cooperated in the twofold task of protecting
our supply lines and disrupting the enemy’s. Fighter elements of
the Eastern Air Command were based at Souk el Arba as air support
for the First Army. Similarly the XII Air Support Command was
brought up to the Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields for the
support of the II Corps. B-17’s were grouped near Biskra, and the
mediums were based on Constantine. Both American and British
planes concentrated primarily on Tunisian targets but began to
range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta-based Beaufighters and
Spitfires aided Allied efforts by striking at Tripolitania and Tunisia
and at Axis air trains over the Sicilian channel. During the first
week of January 520 operational planes of the Twelfth Air Force
and 250 of the Royal Air Force were in Northwest Africa.
Contrary to popular impression, it was estimated that 90 per cent
of the flow of men and supplies across the Sicilian narrows was sea￾borne and that only 10 per cent was sent in by air. This Axis water
route with its excellent air cover was much less vulnerable than the
long coastal route of the Allies between Bone and Algiers.. More￾over, during the first three months of operations the Allied ports,
particularly Bone, were subject to constant and sometimes heavy
air raids.
Operations, 1 January-14 February 1943 (Map 4b).—While the
Allies were “cleaning up their administrative tail” (a phrase coined
by General Montgomery), the Germans held undisputed possession
of the initiative. That they appreciated the precarious position of
the Allies is indicated by the following extract from an Allied Force
Headquarters report:
In a raptured German document, dated December 16th, we found
set forth Field Marshal Rommel’s “Appreciation of Situation,”
which underlined all our weaknesses of communication and supply,
stressed the conglomerate nature of our forces by a shrewd observa￾tion that such a force “probably lacks cohesion and suffers from the
inherent weakness of an Allied command,” and succinctly sum￾marized our problem in the French sector: “Facing Gabes and
Sousse are the elements of three French divisions, all ill-equipped
and of doubtful morale.”
Operating from the Kairouan area, the enemy on 2 January
launched an attack on the French position at Fondouk. The garri￾son was surrounded and Fondouk captured. Although the Pinchon
gap into the Ousseltia valley was threatened, the enemy did not
exploit his success.
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26
The next German thrust came on 18 January at the junction point
of the British and French sectors in the Bou Arada-Pont du Fahs
area. The initial attacks, in which the new Mark VI (“Tiger”)
tank made its debut, were stopped by the British, but not before
Bou Arada was threatened. The same day the enemy attacked from
Pont du Fahs southwest toward Robaa in a drive that if successful
would isolate the French in the mountains to the east.
During the next thirty-six hours Allied forces moved to meet the
Axis advance. The British 6th Armored Division regrouped in the
Bou Arada area and sent a squadron of tanks and some artillery to
help the French troops while Combat Command B of the American
1st Armored Division moved up to Maktar. The American II Corps,
to the south, was assembling elements of the 1st Infantry and 1st
Armored Divisions in the vicinity of Sbeitla for use as a reserve.
On 19 January the British counterattacked, advancing nine miles
east of Bou Arada and clearing the road north of that town. Neverï؟¾theless, the enemy drive to the southwest continued, and Robaa was
occupied. This forced the French forces to withdraw to the west,
the British V Corps conforming by pulling back its right flank. Axis
troops attacked again on 20 January, reaching Ousseltia that night
and isolating French units that'had been holding out in the Eastern
Dorsal.
During the next few days the Allied forces began to restore the
situation. Elements of the British 6th Armored Division advanced
on the Robaa-Pont du Fahs road, and Combat Command B moved
into positions at the south end of the Ousseltia valley, where it was
able to extricate the isolated French units. At this time additional
American forces from the 1st Infantry Division arrived to strengthen
the Allied lines.
By 25 January the enemy's attack had spent its force, and the
positions became stabilized. On that date General Eisenhower, with
the concurrence of the French, appointed General Anderson of the
British First Army commander of all Allied ground forces in Tuï؟¾nisia. General Anderson assigned the American II Corps the reï؟¾sponsibility for the sector south of Fondouk—where it had been
operating.
The enemy did not remain quiet for long. On 30 January he
shifted his main effort and attacked the French troops that were
holding Faid Pass, a position that screened the American 1st Arï؟¾mored Division. Supported by sixty tanks, the Axis force captured
the town of Faid and made further penetrations to the south and
west, although the French retained the road junction at Sidi Bou

27
Zid, a few miles west of Faid. Combat Command A of the 1st
Armored Division, at Sbeitla, was at once ordered east in support.
Combat Command D * was ordered to relieve enemy pressure on
the French by attacks eastward from Gafsa. This force of Amer￾ican armor and infantry attacked Sened, where it was contained by
the enemy. Meanwhile Combat Command C moved northeast to cut
the Sidi bou Zid-Maknassy road. After reaching Sidi bou Zid on
the afternoon of the 31st, it turned south toward Maknassy.
Although the Allies succeeded in denying the enemy further gains,
the ground lost could not be retaken. Combat Command A attacked
Faid on the morning of 1 February, but after fruitless assaults that
continued during the next day the action was broken off. To the
south the armored units captured Sened but during 3 and 4 February
were withdrawn from the Gafsa area and concentrated with other
II Corps units near Sbeitla. This move was ordered by General
Anderson because of the situation at Faid and exaggerated reports
of enemy concentrations between Ousseltia and Kairouan.
As a result of the enemy attacks from the middle of January to
the early days of February the Allied defensive barrier along the
Eastern Dorsal had been seriously weakened, and the arrival of
Rommel’s forces in southern Tunisia had made the situation even
less secure. There was no other alternative but to withdraw the
poorly equipped French units from the line so that they could be
issued modern weapons and trained in their use. Troops of the
American 34th Infantry Division began to take over portions of the
French sector. The front remained quiet from 5 to 14 February,
during which time both sides made strenuous efforts to bring up
additional supplies and reinforcements.
During the period from early November 1942 to the end of Jan￾uary 1943 the British Eighth Army, it will be recalled, had pursued
Rommel’s army across most of Egypt and Libya. On 23 January
the Eighth Army had entered Tripoli, and that fine port was at last
in Allied hands. Rommel continued his retreat toward the Tunisian
frontier, which he crossed on 4 February. In exactly three months
the Eighth Army had advanced 1400 miles from El Alamein, and
as a result its administrative services were stretched to the limit.
Before offensive operation could be resumed, the port of Tripoli had
to be placed in service so that reserves of supplies could be built up.
Eight weeks were to pass after the entry into Tripoli before Mont￾gomery’s army was ready for the opening phase of the Battle of
* A provisional force made up principally of the 1st Armored Division’s artil￾lery headquarters, a battalion of the 168th Infantry (34th Division), an armored
battalion, and a battalion of armored artillery.
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28
Mareth. This was to be a period of some anxiety to the Allied comï؟¾manders, for while the Eighth Army was making its preparations
and the remainder of the Allied forces were building up their
strength, the enemy troops in Tunisia were free to devote their full
attention to the British First Army and the American II Corps,
thinly stretched out over a wide front. With Rommel’s divisions
available, the total Axis strength in Tunisia had increased to approxiï؟¾mately 200,000 combat troops.
Battle of Kasserine Pass, 14-26 February 1943 (Map 5).—During
the first two weeks of February an extensive regrouping of Allied
forces took place. In the II Corps sector the 1st Armored Division,
less detachments, was assigned a front of about fifty miles from
Djebel Trozza, near Fondouk, to Djebel Ksaira, south of Faid Pass.
Combat Command B was attached to the British at Maktar. Comï؟¾bat Command A and the 168th Regimental Combat Team of the 34th
Division moved into the Sidi Bou Zid area, where the 168th was
placed in defensive positions on Djebel Ksaira and Djebel Lessouda
(positions that jvere not mutually supporting) to cover Faid Pass.
Combat Command C was concentrated at Hadjeb el Aioun, and the
remainder of the 1st Armored Division was at Sbeitla. The 26th
Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division was in the
Feriana area.
The Germans did not remain passive for long, for at dawn on
14 February they launched a determined attack from Faid in the
direction of Sbeitla-Kasserine and made a secondary attack from
Maknassy, in the south. The enemy forces involved in these initial
attacks were the entire 21st Panzer Division, which had been withï؟¾drawn from Rommel’s army in Tripolitania, and elements of the
10th Panzer Division, which had recently been re-equipped at Sfax.
The immediate objective of the main attack, which was supported
by artillery, motorized infantry, Stuka dive bombers, and fighter
planes, was the road junction about five miles north of Sidi Bou Zid.
The enemy first overran a battalion of armored artillery on the
slopes of Djebel Lessouda, near the road junction, and by 0715 hours
had occupied the road junction itself with a force that included some
twenty tanks. Allied forces on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira were
threatened with complete encirclement. One battalion of tanks of
Combat Command A, supported by a battalion of artillery, launched
a counterattack against the enemy south of Djebel Lessouda while
the remainder of Combat Command A withdrew to the west to take
up a defensive position at a road junction about ten miles northwest
of Sidi Bou Zid.

29
Axis armor continued to pour through the pass. One column of
about fifty tanks and some infantry flanked Djebel Lessouda from
the north and west and drove on Sidi Bou Zid. After suffering very
heavy losses, the American armored battalion and its artillery broke
off the engagement and, reduced to the point of ineffectiveness, es￾caped to the west. The troops on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira,
although still in fighting condition, were practically isolated by
1300 hours. Throughout the day the highways in the quadrangle
Faid-Maknassy-Gafsa-Sbeitla swarmed with German armor and
infantry. In the south one force of about thirty tanks had advanced
northwest from Maknassy and by evening wag threatening Sidi Bou
Zid from the southwest. Another column was advancing along the
Sened-Gafsa road. Gafsa, in danger of being cut off entirely, was
evacuated in the evening, the troops there withdrawing to Feriana
to protect the important airfields near Thelepte. A new defensive
line was planned for the protection of Feriana and Sbeitla. During
the night of 14-15 February Combat Command B was ordered south
from Maktar to support the remainder of the 1st Armored Division.
General Fredendall ordered the 1st Armored Division to counter￾attack on the morning of 15 February. Accordingly Coiribat Com￾mand C moved south from Hadjeb el Aioun and with elements of
Combat Command A and a British armored infantry battalion at￾tacked about 1600 hours on 15 February. As the leading battalion’s
armor approached the enemy defensive position, running north￾south through Sidi Bou Zid, a formation of German tanks was
sighted, and within an hour a fierce running battle was in progress.
Although the combat command reported the situation under control,
appearances proved deceptive, for the frontal action of the enemy’s
tanks merely served to divert attention from a sweeping flanking
maneuver already under way. The British battalion was following
Combat Command C to exploit such success as the counterattack
might achieve when suddenly it found both its right flank and rear
under the deadly fire of a large German tank force. The Allied
troops were then ordered to extricate themselves, and all units fell
back rapidly except the leading armored battalion, which had not
received the order. It was engulfed by the enemy. As the British
had done at Knightsbridge, our tanks had charged blindly into an
ambuscade. The units on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira were now
completely cut off, and any thought of going to their relief had to
be abandoned.
Confused fighting continued east and southeast of Sbeitla during
16 February, dive bombers inflicting heavy personnel casualties on
Combat Command A. By this time the II Corps had suffered serious

30
losses in equipment, ninety-eight medium tanks, fifty-seven halfï؟¾tracks, twelve 155-mm. howitzers, and seventeen 105-mm. howitzers
having been lost. There was now no possibility of further counterï؟¾attacks to hold the four armored divisions * that the enemy was
employing, much less to restore the Allied strategic position.
Since this Axis drive endangered the position of the French XIX
Corps on the Eastern Dorsal, the First Army commander ordered
the withdrawal of all forces to the high ground of the Western Dor^
sal and the line Feriana-Kasserine-Sbeitla. A battalion of infantry
from the 1st Infantry Division and a regiment of combat engineers
were assigned the task of organizing a defensive position in Kasï؟¾serine Pass, about six miles northwest of the town of Kasserine.
On 16 February General Fredendall directed the 1st Armored
Division to hold Sbeitla at all costs until 1100 hours, 17 February,
in order to secure time to establish the position at Kasserine. In
compliance with this order the remnants of Combat Commands A
and C were disposed south and east of the town. They were attacked
by the enemy at 0900 hours on the 17th, but held their ground until
1500 houi^s, when Combat Command A moved north to the vicinity
of Sbiba and C withdrew along the Sbeitla-Kasserine road. Combat
Command B, having completed its movement from Maktar, covered
the withdrawal. The entire 1st Armored Division was now ordered
to concentrate about ten miles southeast of Tebessa as a reserve to
meet any enemy drive through the defenses of the passes in the
Western Dorsal—El Abiod, Dernia, and Kasserine.
By nightfall the Axis forces had occupied Sbeitla, Kasserine, and
the Thelepte airfield and had infiltrated into the hills toward Kasï؟¾serine Pass. The loss of the airfield was a serious blow to the Allies,
but they had managed to evacuate most of the planes and stores and
had destroyed what could not be moved.
By daylight of 18 February the American 34th Infantry Division
(less the 168th RCT) arrived at Sbiba to take over the defense of
that pass and relieve Combat Command A, which was to join the
rest of the 1st Armored Division southeast of Tebessa. Supported
by the 18th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division
and a British Guards brigade, the 34th Division sustained attacks
by tanks and infantry during 18, 19, and 20 February in what was
actually a strong diversionary maneuver to prevent reinforcements
being sent south to Kasserine, where the enemy planned to make
his major attack.
* The 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions and the Italian 131st Centauro
Division.
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In Kasserine Pass the highway forks. One branch leads north
to Thala, the loss of which would open the road to Le Kef and effecï؟¾tively cut off the II Corps from other Allied forces to the north; the
other branch leads northwest to Tebessa, which was the key comï؟¾munications center of the Allied southern front and the location of
large supply installations.
Rommel consolidated his position and strengthened his forces in
the Kasserine area on 18 February. On the 19th he made a reconï؟¾naissance in force with a battalion of infantry supported by tanks,
but the attack was not pressed when it met stout resistance, includï؟¾ing accurate American artillery fire. During the night, however,
enemy units successfully infiltrated to high ground on both the northï؟¾ern and southern sides of the pass and from these vantage points
brought effective mortar and small-arms fire on the defenders. At
daybreak on the 20th a determined attack carried the pass, forcing
the defending troops back toward Tebessa.
Fortunately the Allies had also been active during the night of
19-20 February. Brigadier Dumphie, commander of the British
26th Armored Brigade, organized a special task force of one comï؟¾pany of motorized infantry, one armored squadron, one troop of
antitank guns, a troop of motorized artillery, and a battalion of
infantry and took position astride the Thala road about ten miles
north of Kasserine Pass. It was this force that bore the brunt of
the Axis attack on the 20th. The armored squadron lost all of its
tanks, and the infantry battalion also suffered severe losses, but the
force held grimly to its position.
During the night of 20-21 February some additional British forces
moved up behind the task force to cover the Thala road, and others
were posted astride the road three miles south of Thala. Combat
Command B was moved from the 1st Armored Division concentraï؟¾tion area to a position on Djebel Hainra to cover the road to Tebessa.
On the 21st about forty enemy tanks attacked this position, but they
were repulsed.
On the 21st a strong German force renewed the attack on the
Thala road. The British continued to suffer heavy losses but held
the enemy ten miles from Thala. Two field artillery battalions from
the American 9th Division and part of the 16th Infantry Regiment
(1st Infantry Division) lent material assistance to the defense.*
During the night of 21-22 February the commanding general of
the American 1st Armored Division was placed in command of all
* The 9th Division artillery made a spectacular forced march from west of
Algiers to Tunisia. In less than 100 hours it covered 735 miles, despite narrow,
congested roads and bitter weather.

31
In Kasserine Pass the highway forks. One branch leads north
to Thala, the loss of which would open the road to Le Kef and effec￾tively cut off the II Corps from other Allied forces to the north; the
other branch leads northwest to Tebessa, which was the key com￾munications center of the Allied southern front and the location of
large supply installations.
Rommel consolidated his position and strengthened his forces in
the Kasserine area on 18 February. On the 19th he made a recon￾naissance in force with a battalion of infantry supported by tanks,
but the attack was not pressed when it met stout resistance, includ￾ing accurate American artillery fire. During the night, however,
enemy units successfully infiltrated to high ground on both the north￾ern and southern sides of the pass and from these vantage points
brought effective mortar and small-arms fire on the defenders. At
daybreak on the 20th a determined attack carried the pass, forcing
the defending troops back toward Tebessa.
Fortunately the Allies had also been active during the night of
19-20 February. Brigadier Dumphie, commander of the British
26th Armored Brigade, organized a special task force of one com￾pany of motorized infantry, one armored squadron, one troop of
antitank guns, a troop of motorized artillery, and a battalion of
infantry and took position astride the Thala road about ten miles
north of Kasserine Pass. It was this force that bore the brunt of
the Axis attack on the 20th. The armored squadron lost all of its
tanks, and the infantry battalion also suffered severe losses, but the
force held grimly to its position.
During the night of 20-21 February some additional British forces
moved up behind the task force to cover the Thala road, and others
were posted astride the road three miles south of Thala. Combat
Command B was moved from the 1st Armored Division concentra￾tion area to a position on Djebel Hainra to cover the road to Tebessa.
On the 21st about forty enemy tanks attacked this position, but they
were repulsed.
On the 21st a strong German force renewed the attack on the
Thala road. The British continued to suffer heavy losses but held
the enemy ten miles from Thala. Two field artillery battalions from
the American 9th Division and part of the 16th Infantry Regiment
(1st Infantry Division) lent material assistance to the defense.*
During the night of 21-22 February the commanding general of
the American 1st Armored Division was placed in command of all
* The 9th Division artillery made a spectacular forced march from west of
Algiers to Tunisia. In less than 100 hours it covered 735 miles, despite narrow,
congested roads and bitter weather.

32
operations in the Thala-Kasserine-Djebel el Hainra sector. During
the preceding few days command of the Allied troops in this area
had changed several times, with much resultant confusion.
On 22 February the enemy again attacked north, the,British on
the Thala road being engaged by about fifty tanks. Some ground
was yielded, but counterattacks restored the former positions. Durï؟¾ing the afternoon one battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which
had been attached to Combat Command B in the Djebel el Hainra
sector, counterattacked against the German left flank. Launched
from the vicinity of Ain Bou Dries and supported by some artillery
from the 9th Division, this attack was completely successful, about
400 prisoners being captured. In large measure it was the cause of
the enemy’s decision to withdraw through the pass.
During the early phases of the fighting bad weather had hampered
air operations, but at this time the skies cleared and the Allies were
able to strike telling blows on the enemy columns. Aircraft of the
XII Air Support Command flew most of the missions, but other eleï؟¾ments of the air forces, reorganized during this period for closer
coordination with the ground troops, were also of great assistance.
Early on the morning of 23 February the Germans began to withT
draw through Kasserine Pass. Mine fields and well-fought delaying
actions prevented the Allies from doing them much damage during
the pursuit. By 26 February they had reached the general line
Hadjeb el Aioun-Sidi Bou Zid-Gafsa, where they remained.
Comments.—The specific purposes of the Axis attacks during Janï؟¾uary and February were: (1) to capture the areas commanding the
mountain passes and thus broaden the long coastal corridor in order
to safeguard the communications between von Arnim’s and Romï؟¾mel’s armies; (2) to make their airfields in the coastal areas safer
from Allied interference; and (3) to throw the Allied forces off
balance before any coordinated attack could be launched. The Gerï؟¾man high command felt that Tunisia could be held and during this
phase continued to pour in men until 200,000 combat troops, three
fifths of them German, were available by 1 March.
By mid-February over 500,000 Allied troops were in North Africa,
and plans were being made for a large-scale offensive. Reinforceï؟¾ments for the British First Army and the American II Corps were
moving up, and Montgomery’s Eighth Army was preparing to apï؟¾proach the Mareth Line in full force. But before the Allies were
ready to strike, Rommel made his only really dangerous effort of the
campaign when he struck at Faid Pass on 14 February. The initial
reverses suffered by the American troops can be attributed to several

33
factors: (1) confusion in all ranks resulting from divided units
and an improvised chain of command; (2) inexperience of troops
engaged; (3) dispersion of forces over a wide front and lack of
sufficient troops to provide adequate local reserves for the forward
elements; (4) unskillful use of terrain and available forces in the
defense.
Many lessons were learned during the Faid-Kasserine operations,
but probably the most valuable one was the age-old principle of the
necessity for concentration of combat power. Once again it was
demonstrated that so long as reserves remain available for employï؟¾ment in time and at the proper place, no situation is beyond repair,
regardless of initial setbacks or the necessity for surrendering some
ground.
Rommel failed in his objectives in spite of the piecemeal nature
of the early resistance offered, particularly on the part of the very
considerable armor we had in the Kasserine area. If he had thought
he could exploit his breakthrough as far as Le Kef and seriously
threaten the Allied communication lines, that quickly proved to be
beyond his strength. If he intended merely a spoiling attack to do
maximum damage to our equipment, he had succeeded in inflicting
serious wounds without, however, affecting Allied strength more
than temporarily. In any event, his sands were running out, and
the turn of the tide at Kasserine proved to be the turn of the tide in
all of Tunisia as well.
PERIOD OF ALLIED INITIATIVE, March-May 1943
General.—The French political situation was no longer a serious
factor in military operations, and the diminishing threat of an Axis
drive through Spanish Morocco released additional Allied troops for
the Tunisian front. In spite of the reverses suffered during January
and February, the Allied supply and troop build-up had continued.
The supply installations in the Tebessa area had been augmented
to support the II Corps and the approaching British Eighth Army.
The rains had ceased, roads had been improved, railroads had been
rehabilitated, and gasoline pipelines had been constructed. Amerï؟¾ican troops had received their baptism of fire, and in spite of the
initial reverses suffered in clashing with the best the Germans had
to offer, they had come out of the campaign battle-wise and tactiï؟¾cally efficient.
To go back for a moment, the projected reorganization of the
Allied command took place just at the time of the unsuccessful deï؟¾fense of Kasserine Pass. Air Chief Marshal Tedder's Mediterra-

34
nean Air Command became operational on 19 February, with Major
General Carl Spaatz as commander of the subordinate Northwest
African Air Force.* On the 20th Admiral Cunningham was anï؟¾nounced as Commander in Chief, Mediterranean,** and on the same
day General Alexander assumed command of the Eighteenth Army
Group.
General Alexander’s first order regrouped the Tunisian forces and
returned detached brigades, regiments, and combat teams to their
original formations. The battle area was divided into three national
sectors: the British First Army in the north, the French XIX Corps
in the center, and the American II Corps toward the south. Prior
to this reorganization units had of necessity been sent forward pieceï؟¾meal to take positions on a shifting front, and the resulting confusion
had been increased by the hasty improvisation of battle groups to
meet the demands of a rapidly changing situation. Under these
circumstances it had been impossible to avoid the separation of
units from their parent commands, and troops of all three nationï؟¾alities had become intermingled.
The wisdom of the Allied command revisions had already been
apparent in the increased effectiveness of Allied air power during
the final stages of the Battle of Kasserine Pass and in closer cooperaï؟¾tion of the ground forces. One example of this effective coordinaï؟¾tion is of special interest. As Rommel’s columns advanced toward
Tebessa and Thala after breaking through Kasserine Pass, Alexï؟¾ander ordered a strong diversion by the Eighth Army. Montgomery
was not ready to attack at Mareth, but he staged a mock preparation
for a large assault. This, together with mounting Allied resistance
as he pushed westward, caused the German commander to make a
hasty withdrawal. He pulled his tanks out of contact and rushed
them back to the south toward what he thought was the most threatï؟¾ened part of his front.
Early in March Lieutenant General Patton, whom we have met
before as a major general, took over command of the American II
Corps.
After the Battle of Kasserine Pass; the enemy directed his main
pressure against the British V Corps (Map 6a). During the first
week in March, Medjez el Bab was the chief objective, but the Axis
attacks at this point were a failure, as were the attempts to take
* The Northwest African Air Force was organized as follows:
Strategic Air Force—Major General James H. Doolittle.
Tactical Air Force—Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham.
Coastal Air Force—Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd.
** This gave him command of all Allied naval forces in this area.

35
Bou Arada, farther south. To the north, on the coastal road, von
Arnim met with some local success and after a fierce struggle forced
the V Corps to evacuate Sedjenane. He then made an unsuccessful
attempt to drive down the road to Beja. By 17 March these attacks
had forced back the British line in the sector northwest of that town,
but further advances were then definitely halted by the V Corps.
Battle of Mareth, 21-29 March 1943.—During the first week in
March the Axis command undoubtedly knew that General Mont￾gomery’s Eighth Army would shortly stage a full-scale attack upon
Mareth. In order to disrupt the British preparations and postpone
the attack, Rommel took the initiative and on 6 March attacked from
the vicinity of Toujane (southwest of Mareth) toward Medenine.
This attack was delivered by a strong armored force—elements of
the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. The British were on the
alert and, having over 500 antitank guns in position around Mede￾nine, knocked out fifty-two enemy tanks during the day while com￾mitting only one squadron of their own armor, which lost no tanks.
This unsuccessful engagement cost Rommel over half the armor in
his attacking force. He had thrown his armored troops against
defended localities without adequate reconnaissance and before the
supporting infantry had cleared a path. The time when even Rom￾mel could lightly disregard basic principles had passed, and the
disaster that he courted was inevitable.
From the 6th until the 20th the Eighth Army continued to gain
strength as its rear units came up. By the latter date its main
components were as follows:
X Corps: 1st and 7th Armored Divisions and 4th Indian Di￾vision.
XXX Corps: 50th and 51st Infantry Divisions and one armored
brigade.
New Zealand Corps (especially formed for this operation) : 2d
New Zealand Division, an armored brigade, an ar￾mored car regiment, a medium artillery regiment,
and Leclerc’s French force.
At this time General Montgomery had 600 tanks to Rommel’s 140.
The Axis foot troops at Mareth were estimated at 120,000, and these
too were outnumbered by the British.
The original plan was for the XXX Corps to penetrate the left of
the enemy’s Mareth position and capture Gabes. The X Corps was
to be held in army reserve ready to exploit the anticipated break￾through. Meanwhile the New Zealand Corps, screened by General
Leclerc’s French Desert Force, was to make a wide.swing around
the right flank of the position and was then to move north and east
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36
to cut the Axis line of retreat. The American II Corps was to secure
Maknassy and contain enemy armor which would otherwise be availï؟¾able for use against the Eighth Army. All available air power in
North Africa would be used to support the attack.
The Americans started first. At dawn on 16 March operations
were launched by the II Corps in order to carry out its part of the
plan. The attacking force consisted of the 1st Armored Division
and the 1st and 9th * Infantry Divisions. Gafsa was occupied withï؟¾out opposition on 17 March, and supply points were established for
the later use of the Eighth Army. The American troops pushed on
and occupied El Guettar. So far the Italians, who were holding this
part of the front, had offered little opposition and had executed a
planned withdrawal, but east of El Guettar they took up a strong
defensive position to halt any further advance of the Americans.
Farther north, rains immobilized the 1st Armored Division and
delayed its attack on Maknassy.
The battle began at Mareth on the night of 20-21 March. The
XXX Corps’ attack against the north sector of the Mareth Line was
at first successful. The 50th Division began the assault and during
21 March gained a foothold in the Mareth defenses, a bridgehead
two miles wide beyond the deep Wadi Zigzaou, which was the chief
antitank obstacle. Axis counterattacks were held off for the next
two days, but in the face of increasing pressure the British had to
withdraw to their original positions on the night of 23-24 March.
Meanwhile the New Zealand Corps had moved out during the
night of 19-20 March. After completing a 150-mile march across
trackless mountains and deserts, it made contact with the enemy
southwest of El Hamma on 24 March.
In view of the failure to penetrate the left of the enemy line, Genï؟¾eral Montgomery decided to reinforce the New Zealand Corps; so
the X Corps headquarters and the British 1st Armored Division
were sent to join the New Zealanders on the night of the 23d. The
combined forces were then designated the X Corps.
This increasing threat to Rommel’s line of retreat forced him to
transfer most of his German troops from the Mareth position to El
Hamma, leaving the Italian divisions and a few Germans to face
the XXX Corps. General Montgomery immediately took advantage
of this weakening of the Axis line and ordered the 4th Indian Diviï؟¾sion to drive to the west to open up the Medenine-Bir Soltane road.
The 7th Armored Division was held behind the south flank of the
* One regimental combat team of the 9th was attached to the 1st Armored
Division.
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37
Mareth Line so as to be in position to go around the enemy's right
flank and cut the Mareth-Gabes road.
On 26 March the 2d New Zealand Division attacked and broke
through the strongly held defile southwest of El Hamma. Heavy
fighting continued throughout the night. In the noise and confusion,
and aided by the darkness, the British 1st Armored Division passed
straight through the enemy. By the 27th the British were at the
outskirts of El Hamma, their advance having been strongly supï؟¾ported by twenty-two squadrons of the Royal Air Force. About the
same time the 4th Indian Division opened the Medenine-Bir Soltane
road, which greatly shortened the line of communication to the El
Hamma sector. Rommel now saw that the Mareth position was
untenable and commenced a general withdrawal.
In the meantime Patton's advance eastward from Gafsa was makï؟¾ing slow progress. On 21 March his 1st Armored Division captured
Sened against only slight opposition and on the following day Makï؟¾nassy was taken, but beyond there the armor was unable to peneï؟¾trate. Farther south the American 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions,
with the help of a Ranger unit, broke through the defensive position
of an Italian division east of El Guettar, but heavy counterattacks
by the German 10th Panzer Division barred further advance to the
east.* However, the Americans materially aided the Eighth Army
by containing the 10th Panzer Division in the El Guettar-Maknassy
sector.
Farther north an attack by the American 34th Division on 25
March failed to break through the strong German position southï؟¾west of Fondouk.
When Montgomery's maneuvers caused Rommel to withdraw from
the Mareth Line, the XXX Corps advanced along the coast. The
2d New Zealand and British 1st Armored Divisions, after their sucï؟¾cess in the El Hamma area, pushed on to Gabes, which they entered
on 29 March.
In the extreme northern sector the British V Corps counterï؟¾attacked on 28 March. It recaptured Sedjenane on 30 March and
penetrated beyond to Cape Serrat. The enemy withdrew from the
salient south of Bou Arada under pressure of other British forces.
Pursuit to Enfidaville (Map 6b).—Rommel's next stand was on
the Wadi Akarit, an excellent defensive position with the flanks
protected by the salt marshes and the sea. At this time Alexander's
general plan was for the Eighth Army to break the Wadi Akarit
position and the American II Corps to assist by threatening Rom-
* The series of actions in this area is known as the Battle of El Guettar.
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38
mePs rear. A part of the British IX Corps, supported by the Amerï؟¾ican 34th Infantry Division, would launch an attack eastward
through Fondouk with the mission of capturing Kairouan and
threatening the enemy's line of retreat. Farther north the British
V Corps was to secure positions from which a future drive could be
made-on Tunis.
By 6 April General Montgomery had regrouped his army and was
ready to attack the enemy at Wadi Akarit. The main assault, deï؟¾livered by the XXX Corps and directed at the center of the enemy
line, opened with a 500-gun artillery bombardment. It began at
0415 hours—in total darkness. The Axis troops, in spite of their
desperate counterattacks, could not prevent the collapse of their
line on the following day, and another withdrawal commenced. The
2d New Zealand Division and the British 1st Armored Division
passed through the gap created by the XXX Corps and closely purï؟¾sued the retreating Axis troops. Sfax was occupied on 10 April
and Sousse two days later. Rommel had clearly been surprised by
the speed with which the Eighth Army had concentrated for this
attack, for a considerable portion of his armor had been dis*****ed
to contain the American forces farther north. Prisoners taken since
21 March numbered 20,000.
Meanwhile Axis troops had held off all attempts by the II Corps
to break through their defenses in the Maknassy-Sened-El Guettar
area. However, after the collapse of the Wadi Akarit position on
7 April they were forced to withdraw, and American patrols made
contact with Eighth Army patrols on the Gafsa-Gabes road, forty
miles east of El Guettar. .
While the enemy was retreating from the Wadi Akarit, the 6th
Armored Division (plus an infantry brigade group) of the British
IX Corps moved to the Fondouk area and with the American 34th
Division attacked Fondouk Pass, as planned. This pass, about 1000
yards wide, is dominated by the hills to the north and south. Infanï؟¾try attacks were launched during the night of the 7th against the
controlling positions of the enemy in an effort to clear a route for
the 6th Armored Division. Very little progress was made, but in
view of the enemy retreat up the coast the 6th Armored was ordered,
on the 9th, to force its way through the gap. The leading regiment
encountered an extensive mine field protected by antitank guns
posted on the flanking hill. A narrow passage was secured by
nightfall at a cost of seventy-six Sherman tanks (sixty of which
were later recovered), and on the next day armored elements
reached Kairouan. On the 11th contact was made with the Eighth
Army, which meanwhile had made rapid progress after occupying

39
Sfax. Although the bulk of Rommel’s forces had been able to escape
the trap, the remnants of nine Italian battalions were rounded up.
The Eighth Army continued the pursuit and on 20 April drove
into Enfidaville against increasing Axis resistance. Further attacks
against the strong enemy position in the hills north of Enfidaville
were met by determined counterattacks which convinced Montï؟¾gomery that a regrouping of his army would be necessary before
further progress could be made.
During this period the V Corps, in accordance with its mission,
started local attacks in the vicinity of Medjez el Bab on 7 April to
secure advantageous positions from which to launch future operaï؟¾tions. The fighting in this northern area was continuous for almost
two weeks, and although a breakthrough was not achieved, some
progress was made. This placed the V Corps in a position to strike
at Longstop Hill, which together with the circle of hills east of
Medjez blocked further progress. All of these dominating heights
were strongly held by the enemy and would have to be cleared before
any breakthrough down the valley toward Tunis could be made.
At this time the V Corps did not have the strength for such an
operation.
Comments.—General Montgomery says of the Eighth Army opï؟¾erations at this time:
The Battle of the Mareth Line was our toughest fight since El Alaï؟¾mein, and whereas the latter was a hard slogging match, at Mareth
there had been greater scope for strategems and subtlety ... As
at El Alamein, Rommel cast in his reserves piecemeal; and when
the battle started, his armour was spread-eagled—with 10 Panzer
Division in the Gafsa sector, 15 Panzer Division soon involved on
the coast, and 21 Panzer Division arriving in the west to back up
the switch line . . .
The outstanding feature of the battle was the air action in coï؟¾operation with the outflanking forces ...
We retained the initiative throughout. Even when we lost our
gains on the coastal flank, Rommel was kept on the move by the
speedy development of the western outflanking movement . . .
Vital considerations (governing the decision to shift strength to
the enveloping force) were, first, the speed with which the decisive
blow could be mounted and delivered and, secondly, the necessity to
hold the German reserves on the eastern flank long enough to preï؟¾vent their assisting the defenders of the switch lines west of El
Hamma.
Montgomery clearly proved that an early setback—such as the
failure of the XXX Corps to penetrate the Mareth Line—need not
necessarily cause a loss of the initiative provided the plan is flexible
and reserves are available.

40
After Mareth, Rommel planned to continue hi? delaying action
and to defend only when the terrain favored the defense. Although
he probably realized that the days of the Axis forces in North Africa
were numbered, his mission was to delay the final outcome as long
as possible. While still fighting the Battle of Mareth, he had preï؟¾pared a strong position behind the Wadi Akarit in the Gabes gap.
Finding that it could not be enveloped by forces advancing from the
south, Montgomery quickly penetrated it—much to the surprise of
the Germans.
After the action at the Wadi Akarit, Rommel lacked defensive
terrain until he reached Enfidaville. During the retreat to this
place the Germans were faced with the difficult problem of withï؟¾drawing under pressure from the west as well as from the south.
While the Eighth Army was pursuing Rommel, the Allies were at
the same time attacking von Arnim’s holding forces in the mounï؟¾tains west of the coastal corridor. At El Guettar, at Maknassy, and
at Fondouk the Allied forces threatened to break through the passes
of the Eastern Dorsal and drive to the sea across Rommel’s line of
retreat. If von Arnim’s men gave way too soon, Rommel would be
trapped; if they stayed too long, they would be cut off by the Eighth
Army. From the course of events we must conclude that once again
the German commanders executed a skillful withdrawal under diffiï؟¾cult circumstances.
Battle of Tunis, 22 April-13 May 1943.—It was now evident that
the Axis forces intended to defend on the line Enfidaville-Bou
Arada-Medjez el Bab-Sedjenane, and General Alexander immeï؟¾diately commenced preparations for a general offensive to break
through this perimeter.
Plans and Preparations.—A large-scale regrouping of the Allied
divisions was decided upon. In the space of two weeks the entire
American II Corps, over 100,000 men, was moved some 150 miles
over difficult country—and across the First Army’s lines of comï؟¾munication—to take over from the British V Corps the sector along
the coast in the north. In this regrouping the American 34th Inï؟¾fantry Division and the British 6th Armored Division moved from
the vicinity of Fondouk and Kairouan to rejoin their respective
corps. At the same time the British 1st Armored Division was
transferred from the Eighth Army to the IX Corps.
These moves were completed about 22 April, and at this time
Major General Omar N. Bradley took over the command of the II
Corps (Map 7).
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41
In its simplest outline the Allied plan provided for a powerful
thrust in the center, heavily supported by armor, with secondary
attacks on the flanks to hold the enemy in position and to prevent
him from concentrating to meet the main attack. The principal
effort was to be made by the two corps of the British First Army
in the direction Medjez el Bab-Tunis. In their zone of attack lay
two natural corridors into the Tunis plain: the valleys of the Medï؟¾jerda and the Miliane. This was terrain where armored units could
best maneuver. The American II Corps, with the Corps Franc
d’Afrique * on its north flank, was to attack on the left of the First
Army, its principal objectives being the high ground southeast of
Mateur and the heights in the area north of Jefna and west of Lake
Achkel. It was expected that the American attack would endanger
the right flank and the rear of the enemy forces facing General
Anderson’s divisions. The British Eighth Army, on the eastern
end of the front, had the role of maintaining pressure on the Axis
forces facing it and of advancing against the enemy's route of escape
into the Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the First and Eighth
Armies was filled by the French XIX Corps, in the Pont du Fahs
area. For this final phase of the campaign General Alexander had
more than twenty divisions. The line of battle was about 140 miles
long.
As the Tunisian campaign developed, the attacks of the Strategic
Air Force were switched to the transportation facilities and ports
of Sicily and southern Italy. At the same time medium bombers
and fighters were striking at surface ships and air transports in
and over the Sicilian strait. The Tactical Air Force was prepared
to support the field armies by bombing and strafing enemy rear
installations, roads, and convoys. By the opening date of the battle,
22 April, the Allied air forces had won mastery of the air from the
Luftwaffe.
Early Operations.—The offensive was launched when the V Corps
commenced its drive on the night of 21-22 April. The initial attack
was directed at Longstop Hill, which was captured on the 26th after
a series of bloody assaults. South of the Medjerda River progress
was made in the direction of Djebel Bou Aoukaz.
The French XIX Corps did not take part in these attacks, but on
its left the British IX Corps pushed east from the Bou Aradaï؟¾Goubellat road in an effort to clear a passage for its 1st and 6th
Armored Divisions through the mountain gaps that lead to the
* A provisional force that consisted principally of two regiments of “Gowns,”
fierce Moroccan highlanders who were expert mountain and night fighters.

42
Goubellat plain. Only partial success had been achieved when Axis
antitank guns, strongly posted in the rocky hills, brought the adï؟¾vance to a definite halt.
While the Eighth Army was attacking north from Enfidaville and
the First Army northeast from Medjez el Bab, the II Corps, on 23
April, launched its attack. The main effort was on the right, where
it could best support the First Army's drive.
The II Corps held a front of about forty miles from Cape Serrat
to the heights bordering the left side of the Medjerda valley. A belt
of rugged hills, fifteen to twenty miles in depth, lay between the
Americans and their initial objective, Mateur, a center of enemy
communications as well as the key to Bizerte. The hills and ridges
in this area form a jumbled maze, providing no broad corridors for
an advance.
In the II Corps zone the 1st * and 34th ** Infantry Divisions and
the 1st Armored Division*** made the main attack. The Tine
River valley seemed to offer the only suitable avenue of advance for
an armored striking force, but before it could be used, the high
ground on both sides had to be taken. Hence the 1st Infantry Diviï؟¾sion attacked into the hills north of the Tine River while the 6th
Armored Infantry of the 1st Armored Division (temporarily atï؟¾tached to the 1st Infantry Division) attacked the enemy in the hills
on the southern rim of the valley. The flank north of the Bejaï؟¾Mateur road was covered by a combat team of the 34th Division.
The remaining units of the 1st Armored and 34th Divisions were
held initially in reserve.
By 26 April the 1st Infantry Division had driven five miles into
the positions southeast of Sidi Nsir, wresting the hills from the
enemy in bloody fighting marked by effective use of artillery and
successful night attacks. A strong coordinated attack was then
launched by the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions with the object of
capturing Hill 609 (Djebel Tahent), the key enemy stronghold that
dominated the highway and railroad from Beja to Mateur. The
34th attacked into the hills overlooking Sidi Nsir, and the 1st conï؟¾tinued its offensive to the northeast. The attack of the 34th was
launched against one of the enemy's strongest centers of resistance.
The Germans had held this ground for months and had organized
the many outlying hills covering the approaches to Hill 609 into a
series of mutually supporting strong points. One by one, these hill
positions were taken, despite heavy and frequent enemy counter-
* Major General Terry de la M. Allen.
** Major General Charles W. Ryder.
*** Major General Ernest N. Harmon.

43
attacks, until on 28 April the advance had carried to the base of
Hill 609. During the 30th General Ryder strengthened the force
attacking the hill, and with the support of some medium tanks it
succeeded in gaining the summit. At dawn on the following day
the Germans counterattacked from positions on the northeastern
slope. They were allowed to advance to within 200 yards of the
American position before a devastating surprise fire repulsed their
effort to retake the summit. This action firmly established the 34th
Division's hold on Hill 609. Tersely summarizing these operations,
General Bradley wrote: “A strong enemy attack was repulsed.
Fighting was intense and bloody. The enemy was engaged with
bayonet and grenade, and there were many cases of outstanding
bravery." The great effort made by the Germans to hold and then
recapture Hill 609 clearly evidenced its importance in the battle
for the entire area.
While the 34th Division was making its attack, the 1st Infantry
Division, on its right, advanced another five miles. With the fall
of Hill 609 the 1st Division's initial hill objectives were made un￾tenable for the enemy, and both divisions progressed more rapidly,
both on the north and south sides of the Tine River.
By 1 May these joint efforts had resulted in the capture of all the
key hill positions in the southern half of the II Corps zone, and the
Tine valley was open for an armored thrust.
In the meantime an attack in the northern part of the corps zone
was being made by the 9th Division * and the attached Corps Franc
d'Afrique. The main objective of this attack was the high ground
generally north of Jefna, where the Germans held hill positions
dominating the approach to Mateur through the Sedjenane valley.
In executing this mission, the 9th Division had to meet difficulties
imposed by both the terrain and the very broad front involved. Re￾connaissance troops were assigned the task of patrolling vigorously
in the nine-mile interval between the 9th and 34th Divisions, since
the nature of the ground was such that it was considered imprac￾ticable to send large units through this area. The plan provided
that one regimental combat team should make a secondary attack
on the enemy defenses west of Jefna, while another (the main effort)
was to strike at the strong points on the high ground to the north
of the town and thus outflank its defenses. The third regimental
combat team and the French were to drive eastward against the
more lightly held positions on both sides of the Sedjenane River.
The operations of the 9th Division and the French units took place
in scrub-covered mountains that continuously tested the energy,
* Major General Manton S. Eddy.

44
perseverance, and fortitude of the troops. Communications were
so poor that food and ammunition had to be carried by burros over
difficult winding trails. However, the attacks were successful, and
by 1 May the Germans had been driven back to the eastern slopes
of the last hills—those that overlook the Mateur plain and Lake
Achkel.
By this date it was evident that the Germans opposite the II Corps
were in a critical situation. In the south the main effort had opened
the Tine valley corridor to Mateur, while in the north the enemy
was threatened with an envelopment of his right flank.
To avoid disaster, the Germans made a general withdrawal on the
night of 1-2 May and the following day. South of Lake Achkel they
took up a position that, if held, would protect Tebourba and the
Tunis plain. North of the lake they prepared for a last-ditch stand
in the hills bordering the main road to Bizerte.
No time was lost by the II Corps in following the retreating Gerï؟¾mans. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to advance northï؟¾eastward from the Tine valley, and it entered Mateur at 1100 hours
on 3 May. This rapid movement threatened to disrupt all the Gerï؟¾man plans. Now an American attack to the east or northeast from
Mateur might effect a breakthrough that would cut off the Axis
/ forces in the Bizerte area from those in the vicinity of Tunis. Enemy
planes, armor, infantry, and artillery were rushed to the threatened
sector in an effort to prevent the 1st Armored Division from adï؟¾vancing beyond Mateur.
In the fighting through 3 May the II Corps had taken Mateur, its
first major prize of the campaign, had prevented von Arnim from
concentrating to meet the British drive down the Medjerda valley,
and, in addition, had threatened the disruption of the entire Axis
right wing. The stage was set in the north for the final battle of
the campaign.
Final Drive, 3-13 May 1943.—Since 22 April the Allied forces had
made limited advances on all fronts, but at no point had a breakï؟¾through been achieved. Therefore, it was clear to General Alexï؟¾ander that additional large-scale infantry attacks would have to be
made. The best prospects seemed to be offered in the Medjez area,
where the successful attacks on Longstop Hill had resulted in clearï؟¾ing enemy strong points north of the Medjerda River. So it was
decided not to continue with the armored attack in the Goubellat
area, but rather to concentrate all available forces for a final decisive
drive on Tunis from Medjez el Bab.

45
Regrouping had started as early as 28 April. Only the British
1st Armored Division and the 46th Infantry Division were left to
contain the enemy armor east of Goubellat, while the remaining
division of the IX Corps (the 6th Armored) together with the 7th
Armored and 4th Indian Divisions from the Eighth Army, was
moved to the V Corps zone of action. At the same time an extensive
plan of deception was put into operation to conceal these moves from
the enemy and to lead him to believe that the next major attack was
to be made in the south by the Eighth Army. Most of the artillery
of its detached divisions was left on the Eighth Army front, and
general activity in that sector was increased greatly. These decepï؟¾tions achieved their object of holding a considerable portion of the
enemy's tanks and antitank guns away from the area selected for
the Allied main attack.
In accordance with the new plan, General Anderson instructed
the V Corps to attack on a narrow front and ordered the IX Corps
to be prepared to pass through the V Corps and capture the inner
defenses of Tunis (Map 8). After taking that city, the First Army
would exploit to the southeast in order to cut off the Cape Bon Penï؟¾insula. On the right and left, respectively, the Eighth Army and
the II Corps were to exert maximum pressure to prevent the enemy
from reinforcing his units facing the First Army. The objective of
the II Corps would be Bizerte, and the Eighth Army was to advance
along the coast so as to assist First Army troops in their effort to
cut off the Axis retreat to Cape Bon.
The First Army's attack was spearheaded by the V Corps. Djebel
Bou Aoukaz was captured on 5 May, and a good line of departure
was established for the drive by the IX Corps toward Tunis. The
attack of the IX Corps was launched at 0300 hours on the 6th. It
was made on a 3000-yard front by two infantry divisions, supported
by tanks and the concentrated fire of 600 guns. Behind the attackï؟¾ing infantry divisions the 6th Armored Division, on the right, and
the 7th Armored Division, on the left, moved out slowly, waiting for
the moment to strike. With continuous sorties for over two hours,
the Northwest African Air Force provided an important addition
to the fire support of the ground troops. By 1100 hours the infantry
attack had broken through the enemy defenses and had opened a
gap for the armored divisions, which by evening reached the Massiï؟¾cault area. On the following morning the armored troops resumed
the advance toward Tunis. Armored cars of both divisions, followed
closely by the remainder of the 7th Armored Division, entered the
city in the afternoon (7 May). The 7th then turned northward
from Tunis and swept on toward Protville, taking large numbers of