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S1116 : 51UNIVERSITY OFMINNESOTA LIBRARYWILSGOVUS 1.1 16:51CURRENTJAN 31'72DOCUMENTSFOREIGN POLICYThe United Statesand North AfricaINTRODUCTIONRecently in the Congress ofthe United States, a crucial debate has been raging. That debateis concerned with some of thefundamentals of our foreign policy over the last three decades,including the question of foreignaid.In this debate, three chargeshave been leveled against theforeign aid program and our policies in the developing world :- that we have looked at theworld solely in Cold War terms;-that we have sought to support only certain kinds of regimes; and-that we have not kept upwith changing world circumstances.as an example, that these assertions are not substantiated .North Africa is, in many ways,a microcosm of the developingworld . Among the four nationsof this area-Morocco, Algeria,Tunisia, and Libya-we find characteristics, problems, reactionsand issues common to most ofthe “ Third World ."The history of our relationshipto this area over the past twodecades demonstrates that ourpolicies have moved and aremoving with the changing tides.They are policies which acceptchange and accept nations asthey are.These states have many characteristics in common : a strongsense of national pride, an underlying belief that the West hasobligations to make up for earlierexploitation, and a keen sensitivity to outside interference. Atthe same time, they are diverse intheirnationalcharacteristics,their forms of government, andtheir resources.Let us go back 20 years - to1951. Only Libya was movingtoward independence, but itsprospects for viability were poor.U.S. POLICY IN AREAThe purpose of this paper is todemonstrate, using North AfricaThis pamphlet is based on a speechby Assistant Secretary of State forAfrican Affairs David D. Newsom atPrinceton University, November 18,1971.DEPARTMENT OF STATEBUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRSOFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES
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their attitudes toward the Sovietsand the Chinese. We, perhaps,underestimated their ability eventhen to stand up against externalinfluences-from all directions.Today, this has changed. Weand they have adjusted to radically new circumstances.PRESENT SITUATIONIts first annual budget was only$6 million, and few knew wherethat would be found.In the other three countries,France played a dominant role,largely to the exclusion of otheroutside influences. Americans inboth government and the privatesector, nevertheless, were beginning to learn about NorthAfrica. They were beginning tobe aware of its peoples and theirquest for freedom. We realizedearlier than most that independence was coming and comingrapidly.But these were, at that time,side issues. Our concern as anation then was the relationshipof this area to the emergingposition of the Soviet Union andto its containment. Before missiles and long-range bombers, ourStrategic Air Command basesin Morocco were considered vitalforour national security. In1951 , also, we made the decisionto seek to retain, in Libya, animportant training base for ourAir Forces in Europe. We ultimately reached agreement andcommitted ourselves initially topay Libya $4 million a year ineconomic assistance.Ten years later, the situationhad changed dramatically, andwe had changed with it. Moroccoand Tunisia were independent.General De Gaulle had stood inAlgiers and had spoken one ofhistory's great ambiguities, " Jegot you. "(" I have understood you ." ) Libya had begun torealize that its deserts coveredvast resources of oil.In those ten years, U.S. policies had moved, too. PresidentEisenhower had agreed to theevacuation of our air bases inMorocco. Our earlier interest andconfidence in Tunisia was followed by a pledge of long-termdevelopment aid-without conditions or demands for facilities. In1964, we agreed in principle withthe Government of Libya to theevacuation of our military facilities whenever they were notwanted. We were preparing tohelp independent Algeria withsubstantial food and technicalaid.Each of these countries, asthey became independent,looked to us in a special way.They sought alternatives to fulldependence upon the formermetropole. It was not yet fashionable to turn massively to theSoviets or the Chinese.Morocco, because of earlylinks with the United States,encouragement by individualAmericans, and the presence ofour bases, expected special help.Algeria, despite harboring aresentment because of our support for the French, looked to usas an early sympathizer andbenefactor.Tunisia, under the leadershipof Habib Bourguiba, remembered earlier help and encouragement and looked to us.Libya saw in us and the Britishthe primary sources of criticalfinancial help. The Libyan Kingfelt both an indebtedness to usfor our support at the UnitedNations for Libyan independenceandterritorialunitydespiteSoviet opposition, and a dependence upon us.Ten years ago, we were deeplyinvolved. These nations had expectations of us. We expected tofind friends and support, particularly against growing inroads ofSoviet influence. We did tend tojudge nations in those days byEach of the four countries isnow fully independent.Each has, further, demonstrated its independence in policies toward the former metropoles and toward other countries. Each country has diversified its relationships. None is anylonger dependent predominantlyupon a single power, politicallyor economically. Each in its particular way has sought to qualifyas " nonaligned ."The area has seen major politicalupheavalswhichhavechanged the leadership and, inthe case of Libya, the basicreorientation of the country.There has been a dramaticdiscovery and development ofresources, primarily oil and gas,in the last ten years. The directimportance of the area economically to Europe has expanded.All of this has brought a verybasic change in the relationshipbetween North Africa and theUnited States.Except for the use of communications facilities at oneMoroccan base, we no longerhave any military facilities inNorth Africa.The proposition of economicassistance provided by the UnitedStates has steadily declined asEuropean countries have assumeda larger share.U.S. grant military assistance2
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Tand military involvement have declined substantially.Our relationship with theleadership is changing. The generation has passed or is passingwhich recalls our initial help tothe newly independent countries.This change happened early inAlgeria where the original leadersof the FLN ( National LiberationFront) whom we had knownwere replaced by those we didnot know. In Libya, those whorecognized and welcomed ourhelp to that country in its earlyyears have been replaced; boththe present prosperity and thechanged circumstances have obliterated recollections of thatearlier relationship.Where there has been an abrupt change in a country inwhich we had close relationswith the previous regime, wehave had the added element ofsuspicions regarding our intentions on the part of the newleaders. Only time can overcomesuch feelings.The last decade, further, hasseen climactic events in the NearEast which have affected ourown relationships. Algeria brokediplomatic relations with us; relations with the other three nations of the area became difficultin the months immediately following the 1967 war. The beliefthat we had helped Israel to winthe six-day war died hard . Whilethese nations may not have beendirectly involved in the fighting,they were committed as Arabsand shared the feelings of humiliation and bitterness over theseevents. The Near Eastern issuesremain a serious, but not insurmountable, problem in our relations with North African countries.In 1971 , we have new interestsand requirements. For the firsttime in our peacetime history,we face shortages of significantresources. One of them is naturalgas. In Washington, D.C., early inNovember 1971 , the local gasutility announced it could take nomore new commercial customers;there was simply not enough gas.North Africa-and particularlyAlgeria- has large gas reserves.U.S. POLICY TOWARDNORTH AFRICAOur approach to North Africain these circumstances is basedon certain clear assumptions:- First, North Africa remainsimportant to us as an area. We20 °0 °209ROMANIA100FRANCEYUGOSLAVIAU.S.S.R.ITALYATLANTI CBLACK SEABULGARIAOCEANALBANIA40PORTUGALSPAINWITH 1GREECETURKEYAnnabooSkikdoConstantineBizerte€ALGIE RSTUNISTangierOranRMALTATUNISIA9 SafaqisAsΝ. IFCYPRUSSYRIARABATFesCasablancaMeknesMOROCCOMarrak echBecharLeabsukhayrahLEBANONTRIPOLIBEMIRAQGhardai aOuarglaISRAELBENGHAZITobrukGULF OFCIDERMarsaalBurayqahJORDANCAIROALGERIAZillahTind outInAmenasSAUDIARABIAPEL AAUNSPANISH SAHARASobha .LIBYAEGYPTAlJawtºREDSEAMAURITANIAMALI202NORTH AFRICAOil fieldA Gas fieldOil pipelineGas pipelineNIGERCHADSUDAN200400800O person600Miles200400600800KilometersKHARTOUMBounda ry representation isnot necessarily authoritative2003
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pawns in an international game,but as independent, sovereignnations. We seek relations withthem based on mutual interest,independent of their relationswith others. We recognize andrespect the variety among thenations. The Cold War is overunless others choose to continueit. As the President said in hisreport to the Congress on foreignpolicyinFebruary1970,“ United States Foreign Policyfor the 70's," one of our twomajor concerns in Africa is " thatthe continent be free of greatpower rivalry or conflict in anyform.This is evenmore inAfrica's interest than ours."given us neither the right nor thecapability to determine thecourse of Moroccan political oreconomic life, even if we haddesired to do so.In foreign policy, too, KingHassan has followed an independent course. He has, over theyears, improved his relationswith Europe and has establishedfriendly relations with the SovietUnion. He has taken an activerole in Arab affairs and has frequently used his relationshipwith us to bring to our attentionArab concerns.Neither in Morocco-nor inany other developing countrydo we seek to further or supportany particular system or foreignpolicy. We feel that both are theresponsibility of the peoples ofthe country.We have established a mutually beneficial relationship withMorocco, despite the differentnature of our systems of government. We find a common interestin continuing Moroccan economic growth and the continuedabsence in Morocco of influenceshostile to our basic concerns. Inthe area of economic development, we have no magic formulae to guarantee growth eitherfor ourselves or for the Moroccans. Only the Moroccans, themselves, can assuretheir ownprogress - political, economic, andsocial . We believe, however, thatour assistance has improved theirability to make such progress.BILATERAL RELATIONShave a keen interest in the freedom of the Mediterranean and inthe continued access for all tothat sea and to the nationsaround it. The establishment ofdominant foreign influences adversely affecting these interestson the southern shore of theMediterranean would be a matterof grave concern to us.-Secondly, the orderly development of these nations andtheir resources is important tothem, to Europe, and to us.While there are, and will continue to be, differing views onwhat constitutes a reasonablebasis for access to these resources, there is agreement thatsuch access is important to all.- Thirdly, we shall remain animportant source of the capitaland technology required for thedevelopment of this area. Thenatureof arrangements maychange, but the U.S. private roleis likely to continue.- Fourthly, the nations ofNorth Africa, despite policiesshaped by different histories andinfluences, will all stoutly resistdomination byby any outsidepower. They will defy simplecategorization in any East-Westlineup.- Finally, events in NorthAfrica, as in many other parts ofthe world, will move today withfar less concern over the role ofthe United States and referenceto us than in years past. If wehave interests there, it is our taskto preserve them, whether it bein investment, in trade, or insecurity. We cannot assume thatothers will do it for us.Against the background ofthese assumptions, what is ourapproach to these nations today?We regard them, first, not asMoroccoWe have had particularly closeties with Morocco and Tunisia.Despite the withdrawal of military facilities from Morocco, oureconomic and strategic intereststhere remain substantial. We retain important Voice of Americafacilities. We have growing tradewith Morocco and our investment there is also increasing. Wevalue the presence of this friendat the southern side of the gateway to the Mediterranean.Morocco has, since independence, faced severeeconomicproblems. We have helped in thedevelopment of its agricultureand in meeting problems of employment.King Hassan, thrust suddenlyinto power in 1961 , has ledMorocco skillfully through critical years and critical problems.We have both benefited fromcooperation. Our relationshipwith Morocco, however, hasTunisiaTunisia exemplifies a smallercountry, ably governed by responsible leadership possessinginfluence beyond its borders, butendowed with modest naturalresources.4
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of the widening responsibilitybeing assumed by other nations-a trend entirely consistentwith overall AID policy.AlgeriaThe United States has enjoyed15 years of very close relationswith Tunisia and has contributeda very significant amount of economic assistance - well over $600million since 1956. We have noalliance with Tunisia, no basesthere, and no real strategic interest in that country. U.S. investment is minimal (approximately$12.9 million in FY 1970) . YetU.S. policy over the years hasbeen marked by strong supportfor Tunisia's economic and political independence.The United States was one ofthe first governments to recognize Tunisia in 1956. Our assistance followed the 1961 decisionthat Tunisia should be one of thecountries to receive a long-termcommitment since it possessedtheinfrastructure,sufficienteconomic potential, and politicalwill to serve as a model for otherdeveloping countries.was entirely a Tunisian determination.As a result of the farsightedreforms of President Bourguiba,Tunisia is, in social terms, stillthe most advanced of the Arabstates. Its human resources are itsgreatest wealth and we will continue to be interested in its development and well-being.Tunisia has always had an independent foreign policy. It continues to do so. As its leadershippasses into other hands, we lookfor a continuation of our closerelationship, one based essentially on a common interest inTunisia's development.In both Morocco and Tunisia,however, the basic U.S. role haschanged in the past ten years.Economic assistance is flowing tobothcountriesfrommoresources and the overall U.S. sharehas declined. Tunisia has beenone of the models of the multilateral approach in which a Consultative Group, under the aegisof the World Bank, has, for anumber of years, coordinated theinternational effort.French aid to Tunisia has heldSteady in real terms and aid toMorocco has increased in bothreal and proportionate terms.U.S. aid has declined absolutelyand proportionately in bothcountries.Between 1960 and 1964, theU.S. provided two-thirds of allnon-Communist economic aid toMorocco and Tunisia. Between1965 and 1969, this proportiondeclined to 42 percent of the aidflowing to each. In 1970, theU.S. share dropped still furtheras other donors have increasedtheir share. Our decreasing shareis a reflection of the progressthese countries are making, andDespite this commitment andinterest in Tunisia's success, wedid not attempt to determinethe path Tunisia chose for development. It is difficult to conceive of a leader of PresidentBourguiba's character permittingsuch interference if it had beentried. Tunisian successes anderrors are their own. There weremisgivings within the U.S. Government in 1966-1969 during theperiod of accelerated expansionof agricultural cooperatives andincreased state control over theTunisian economy. It was agreed,however, that the Tunisian experiment was worthy of our continued support. Tunisia's ensuingdecision in 1969 to reverse thecourse of its economic policy togive greater emphasis to privateenterprise and free market forcesOur relations with independent Algeria have been quite different from those with Moroccoand Tunisia .If we go back to 1962, U.S.expectations about the potentialbenefits of bilateral relationswithAlgeriawereprobablyhigher than with most othernewlyindependent countries.They were probably unrealisticat that time given our inexperience in dealing with each other.President Kennedy had felt aspecial interest in Algeria datingfrom his 1957 speech urging thatcountry's independence. TheAlgerian leader, Ben Bella, hadflown back to North Africa, following his release by the French,in a U.S. Air Force plane. Hisfirst foreign visit as Presidentafter Algerian independence wasto the United Nations and Washington where he was received byPresident Kennedy. The fact thatBen Bella chose to proceed byrectly from Washington to Cubawas perhaps an omen of whatwas to come.The Algerians for their partalways held a strong ideologicalbias against the United States.They identified the United Stateswith France through NATO.Conversely, they felt a deepbond of sympathy with thosestates which had endorsed andsupported the long, bitter Algerian war of independence againstFrance: North Viet-Nam, Egypt,the People's Republic of China,and Cuba-all countries with5
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puted leader of Algeria. Hefocused his government's effortson domestic economic development and, in the pursuit of rapidindustrialization the Algeriansfound they wanted the expertiseand technology that privateAmerican enterprise could supply. Many U.S. firms respondedto the indication that they wouldbe welcome.which, in varying degrees, theUnited States was at odds. In thisenvironment of suspicion andhostility, and given the instability and rivalries of the Ben Bellaperiod, it is not difficult to understand the lack of rapport.Even the fact that the UnitedStates supplied some $165 million of PL-480 foodstuffs between 1962 and 1967 was regarded by the Algerians as aminor recompense for the devastation suffered during their independence struggle.The overthrow of Ben Bella onJune 19, 1965, by Minister ofDefense Houari Boumedienne revived briefly U.S. hopes thatsatisfactory relations might bepossible. Boumedienne's seriousapproach and his announced intention to concentrate on hiscountry's problems seemed toaugur well for such a development.With the six-day war, however,Algeria broke diplomatic relations, and all U.S. aid to Algeriaceased by law. At the same time,Algeria seized almost all U.S.firms operating there, principallyoil companies.In retrospect, the break inrelations proved to have hadsome benefits. For one thing itcleared the air. The romanticview of the prospects for U.S.Algerian relations vanished overnight. We recognized that mutualconfidence would not be basedsolely on aid programs, howeverwell-intentioned, nor on publicgestures of support, however sinask.The subsequent upturn inU.S.-Algerian relations has beenmarked by several turning points.One was the emergence of President Boumedienne as the undisAnother major turning pointwas the October 1969 agreementbetween SONATRACH , theState oil company, and the ElPaso Natural Gas Company forthe sale of one billion cubicfeet-per-day of natural gas inliquefied form for importation tothe U.S. east coast. This projectand others like it represent anatural arrangement between theUnited States, with its estimatedannual shortfall in gas supply of35 trillion cubic feet by 1980,and Algeria with the fourthlargest proven, and largely uncommitted, gas reserves in theworld- 130 trillion cubic feet.governments fortor developmentfinancing.During the past two yearsboth governments have, in aspirit of businesslike cooperation, taken actions to enhancethe possibilities for an early realization of these Liquefied NaturalGas ( LNG ) projects. Algeria hasupgraded and strengthened itsdiplomaticrepresentationinWashington-still under the flagof Guinea-and we have donelikewise in Algiers under theSwiss flag. Algeria has resolvedall but one of its expropriationdisputes with U.S. companies.The Export-Import Bank has informed SONATRACH that it isprepared to consider favorablythe financing of several hundredmillion dollars of U.S. exportsfor the construction of the necessary facilities in Algeria for thisproject. The American companies will make no investmentin Algeria, but they will financetheLiquefiedNaturalGastankers. The final authorizationby the U.S. Federal Power Commission-which will set important precedents for the LNGindustry-is the one remainingrequirement.LibyaBut given the past historyof U.S.-Algerian relations, andAlgeria's treatment of U.S. petroleum companies, the hugeamounts of capital needed, andthe respective government authorizations required, it was cleareven in 1969 that to bring theseprojects to fruition would be noeasy task . If they could be implemented, however-and there iscause for optimism that they willbe - they would create the mostsignificant long-term economiclinks between the United Statesand North Africa in history.They would make a substantialcontribution to Algeria's economic development and reduceAlgeria's dependence on foreignU.S. relations with Libya overthe past 29 years have gonethrough the same radical transformations as the country itself.In the pre-oil, pre-military-coupperiod, Libya was considered oneof the most disinherited of thedeveloping countries and showedlittle promise of economic viability. In the early 1950's, Libyawas dependent on U.S., U.K.,and other foreign aid for itseconomic development and mili6
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tary assistance. Libya concludeda defense agreement with theUnited Kingdom , and agreed tothe establishment of Wheelus AirForce Base outside Tripoli and aBritish air base near Tobruk.Wheelus, because of its ideal climatic conditions, became theprincipal training base for U.S.fighter aircraftstationedinWestern Europe.This close relationship, whichwas clearly one of Libyan economic dependence on the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom,was obviously headed for changewhen, in December 1957, Essobecame the first oil company toannounce it had struck oil. By1968, Libya had become one ofthe world's leading oil producersand the per capita GNP of its 1.6million inhabitants had increasedfrom about $100 at independence to $1,640. Reflecting thistransformation,assistanceprogram was ended in 1965.In Libya, the United Statesfaced in a very special way theproblem of identification with aregime. We had provided substantial financial support in the earlydays of the kingdom. We enjoyedthe benefits of military facilities.There was a widespread-but unfounded - belief that the Britishand American Ambassadors dictated policies to Libyan Governments.with the lack of progress in thebuilding of modern institutions.It is conceivable that theUnited States could have had asignificantinfluenceonthecourse of events in Libya, butthis must remain in the realm ofspeculation. Our aid had helpedlaunch the country. The Kingand many of its leaders felt anindebtednesstotheUnitedStates. Yet, it was clear toAmerican officials serving inLibya during those years that thecourse of events was in Libyanhands and would be determinedby Libyans. Neither an earlierwithdrawal of our facilities fromLibya nor the exercise of anyextraordinary influence in thatcountrycouldlikelyhavechanged the basic direction ofevents.It was particularly regrettable,but not at all surprising, that theleaders of the coup of September1969, under Lieutenant (nowColonel ) Qadhafi , took powerwith deep suspicions of theUnited States and with seriou***pectations that we would tryto oppose their coup. The matterwas further complicated by thefact that the new regime, deeplyinfluenced by the frustration ofthe young Arab military officersover the course of the six-daywar, made the Arab struggleagainst Israel a principal tenet ofits foreign policy. Their belief inour unqualified support for Israelremains today the chief obstacleto better relations. Other suspicions have, in all probability,been modified.We adapted quickly to thechange in Libya. It was never ourintention to do otherwise. Weagreed to the evacuation of ourair base near Tripoli and ourCoast Guard navigation station inthe Gulf of Sirte. We modifiedthe nature of our relationship tomeet the new situation.In Libya today, the greatestU.S. interests are, in a sense,beyond the government domain.The investment and activities ofprivate American companies inthe development and productionof Libya's vast oil reserves areessentially matters between thecompanies and Libya. Our rolewhen we have a role-is to seekto explain wider aspects of international relations which maybear on oil policy. In the 1970negotiations, for example, ourofficial effort was confined toexplaining our primary concernsas a government over the consequences for the consuming nations of any break down in negotiations,andtoexplainingactions taken by the U.S. Government in permitting the companies to concert on negotiations.Today the 11 -nation Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC ) , consisting ofAlgeria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,Kuwait, Venezuela, Libya, Qatar,AbuDhabi,Indonesia, andNigeria, are in a strong positionas a result of the world energyoutlook. Demand for oil and gasby the developed world is expanding by leaps and bounds.The OPEC countries have that oiland gas, far in excess of theirown needs. A great amount ofcreative diplomacy by governments and business alike is goingto be required if the demands ofthe producing countries for increasing revenues and for controlof the companies are to be metwithout disrupting the industry,the consumers, and the econoourThere was much less awarenessof the growing concern of American representatives in Libya atthe increasing detachment of theKing from events in the country,the influence of some of thosearound the King on policies and,what was particularly serious, thedisenchantment of many of thebest young men in the country7
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Events have moved. Circumstances have changed. We havechanged with them. We shouldnot regret what has gone before,for that was important to wherewe are today. And today's Libyahas a leadership with which westill have problems, but it is anindependent leadership providingno more of an opportunity toother non-Arab forces than itprovides to us.mies of the producing countriesthemselves. Libya will be a majordriving force among the OPECcountries.It can be asked, in retrospect,what were the benefits we gainedfrom our substantial assistance toLibya in its early days?First, we mustrecallthestrong efforts made by the SovietUnion in those days to haveestablished a Soviet trusteeshipover the former Italian colony ofTripolitania. Our help to Libyaenabled it to emerge and surviveas an independent nation. Thisgave us advantages in access toand the utilization of key facilities during critical years following World War II. It provideda base on which the Libyans andprivate American firms couldbuild the important petroleumindustry that exists in thatcountry today.is an example of the trends andproblems of the developingworld generally.We have, without forgettingour friends, adapted to change inNorth Africa. We see its nationsas individual entities, each withuniquecharacteristics,determining its own future and itsown policies. We see our relations with them as important toour own interests. We can preserve those interests so long aswe are prepared to continue anactive role in the area and to findfoundations for our relationshipsbuilt genuinely on common interests.LONG- RANGE VIEWNorth Africa is a significantarea of the world, at the hubwhere Europe, Africa, and theMiddle East meet. It lies on ourroute of access to southernEurope and the eastern Mediterranean. It is a significant sourceof energy for Europe and willincreasingly become so for us. ItDepartment of State Publication 8622African Series 51Released January 1972For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office,Washington, D.C. 20420 - Price 10 cents# U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1972486-391 / 13UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA3 1951 D03 563264 J8
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