puted leader of Algeria . He
focused his government's efforts on domestic economic develop
ment and , in the pursuit of rapid industrialization the Algerians found they wanted the expertise
and technology that private
American enterprise could sup
ply. Many U.S. firms responded
to the indication that they would
be welcome.
which , in varying degrees, the
United States was at odds. In this
environment of suspicion and hostility , and given the instabil
ity and rivalries of the Ben Bella
period , it is not difficult to un
derstand the lack of rapport.
Even the fact that the United
States supplied some $ 165 mil
lion of PL-480 foodstuffs be
tween 1962 and 1967 was re
garded by the Algerians as a
minor recompense for the devas
tation suffered during their in
dependence struggle.
The overthrow of Ben Bella on
June 19, 1965 , by Minister of
Defense Houari Boumedienne re
vived briefly U.S. hopes that
satisfactory relations might be
possible. Boumedienne's serious
approach and his announced in
tention to concentrate on his
country's problems seemed to
augur well for such a develop
ment.
With the six- day war, however,
Algeria broke diplomatic rela
tions, and all U.S. aid to Algeria
ceased by law. At the same time ,
Algeria seized almost all U.S.
firms operating there , principally
oil companies.
In retrospect, the break in
relations proved to have had
some benefits. For one thing it
cleared the air . The romantic
view of the prospects for U.S.
Algerian relations vanished over
night. We recognized that mutual
confidence would not be based
solely on aid programs, however
well- intentioned , nor on public
gestures of support, however sin
cere.
The subsequent upturn in
U.S. - Algerian relations has been
marked by several turning points.
One was the emergence of Presi
dent Boumedienne as the undis
Another major turning point
was the October 1969 agreement
between SONATRACH, the
State oil company, and the El
Paso Natural Gas Company for
the sale of one billion cubic
feet- per- day of natural gas in
liquefied form for importation to
the U.S. east coast. This project
and others like it represent a
natural arrangement between the
United States , with its estimated
annual shortfall in gas supply of
35 trillion cubic feet by 1980 ,
and Algeria with the fourth
largest proven, and largely un committed , gas reserves in the
world- 130 trillion cubic feet.
governments for t development
financing.
During the past two years
both governments have, in a
spirit of businesslike coopera
tion , taken actions to enhance
the possibilities for an early reali
zation of these Liquefied Natural
Gas ( LNG ) projects. Algeria has
upgraded and strengthened its
diplomatic representation in
Washington-still under the flag
of Guinea-and we have done
likewise in Algiers under the
Swiss flag . Algeria has resolved
all but one of its expropriation
disputes with U.S. companies.
The Export- Import Bank has in
formed SONATRACH that it is
prepared to consider favorably
the financing of several hundred million dollars of U.S. exports
for the construction of the neces
sary facilities in Algeria for this
project. The American com
panies will make no investment
in Algeria, but they will finance
the Liquefied Natural Gas
tankers. The final authorization
by the U.S. Federal Power Com
mission-which will set impor
tant precedents for the LNG
industry-is the one remaining
requirement.
Libya
But given the past history
of U.S.- Algerian relations, and
Algeria's treatment of U.S. petro
leum companies, the huge
amounts of capital needed , and
the respective government au
thorizations required , it was clear
even in 1969 that to bring these
projects to fruition would be no
easy task . If they could be imple
mented, however-and there is
cause for optimism that they will
be - they would create the most
significant long- term economic
links between the United States
and North Africa in history .
They would make a substantial
contribution to Algeria's eco
nomic development and reduce
Algeria's dependence on foreign
U.S. relations with Libya over
the past 29 years have gone
through the same radical trans
formations as the country itself .
In the pre - oil , pre- military - coup
period , Libya was considered one
of the most disinherited of the
developing countries and showed
little promise of economic viabil
ity . In the early 1950's, Libya
was dependent on U.S. , U.K. ,
and other foreign aid for its
economic development and mili
6
|