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S1116 : 51 UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTALIBRARY
S 1.1 16:51 CURRENT JAN 31'72 DOCUMENTS
FOREIGN POLICY
The United States
and North Africa
INTRODUCTION
Recently in the Congress of the United States, a crucial de bate has been raging. That debate is concerned with some of the fundamentals of our foreign pol icy over the last three decades, including the question of foreign aid .
In this debate, three charges have been leveled against the foreign aid program and our pol icies in the developing world :
- that we have looked at the world solely in Cold War terms; -that we have sought to sup port only certain kinds of re gimes; and
-that we have not kept up with changing world circum stances.
U.S. POLICY IN AREA
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, using North Africa
This pamphlet is based on a speech by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David D. Newsom at Princeton University, November 18 , 1971.
as an example, that these asser tions are not substantiated . North Africa is , in many ways, a microcosm of the developing world . Among the four nations of this area-Morocco, Algeria , Tunisia , and Libya-we find char acteristics, problems, reactions and issues common to most of the “ Third World ."
The history of our relationship to this area over the past two decades demonstrates that our policies have moved and are moving with the changing tides.
They are policies which accept change and accept nations as they are .
These states have many char acteristics in common : a strong sense of national pride, an under lying belief that the West has obligations to make up for earlier exploitation, and a keen sensitiv ity to outside interference . At the same time, they are diverse in their national characteristics, their forms of government, and their resources .
Let us go back 20 years - to 1951. Only Libya was moving toward independence, but its prospects for viability were poor.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES
Its first annual budget was only $6 million , and few knew where that would be found .
In the other three countries , France played a dominant role, largely to the exclusion of other outside influences. Americans in both government and the private sector, nevertheless, were be ginning to learn about North Africa . They were beginning to be aware of its peoples and their quest for freedom . We realized earlier than most that independ ence was coming and coming rapidly .
But these were , at that time, side issues . Our concern as a nation then was the relationship of this area to the emerging position of the Soviet Union and
to its containment. Before mis siles and long- range bombers, our Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco were considered vital for our national security . In 1951 , also, we made the decision to seek to retain , in Libya, an important training base for our Air Forces in Europe. We ulti mately reached agreement and committed ourselves initially to pay Libya $4 million a year in economic assistance.
Ten years later, the situation had changed dramatically, and we had changed with it . Morocco and Tunisia were independent.
General De Gaulle had stood in Algiers and had spoken one of history's great ambiguities, " Je vous ai compris." ( " I have under stood you ." ) Libya had begun to realize that its deserts covered vast resources of oil .
In those ten years, U.S. poli cies had moved, too. President Eisenhower had agreed to the evacuation of our air bases in Morocco . Our earlier interest and
2
confidence in Tunisia was fol lowed by a pledge of long- term development aid-without condi tions or demands for facilities . In 1964, we agreed in principle with the Government of Libya to the evacuation of our military facili ties whenever they were not wanted. We were preparing to help independent Algeria with substantial food and technical aid .
Each of these countries, as they became independent, looked to us in a special way. They sought alternatives to full dependence upon the former metropole . It was not yet fash ionable to turn massively to the Soviets or the Chinese.
Morocco , because of early links with the United States , encouragement by individual Americans, and the presence of our bases, expected special help.
Algeria, despite harboring a resentment because of our sup port for the French , looked to us as an early sympathizer and benefactor.
Tunisia , under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba , remem bered earlier help and encourage ment and looked to us.
Libya saw in us and the British the primary sources of critical financial help. The Libyan King felt both an indebtedness to us for our support at the United Nations for Libyan independence and territorial unity despite Soviet opposition, and a depend ence upon us .
Ten years ago , we were deeply involved . These nations had ex pectations of us. We expected to find friends and support, particu larly against growing inroads of Soviet influence . We did tend to judge nations in those days by
their attitudes toward the Soviets and the Chinese. We, perhaps, underestimated their ability even then to stand up against external influences-from all directions.
Today, this has changed . We and they have adjusted to radi cally new circumstances.
PRESENT SITUATION
Each of the four countries is now fully independent.
Each has, further, demon strated its independence in poli cies toward the former metro poles and toward other coun tries. Each country has diversi fied its relationships. None is any longer dependent predominantly upon a single power, politically or economically. Each in its par ticular way has sought to qualify as " nonaligned ."
The area has seen major politi cal upheavals which have changed the leadership and, in the case of Libya , the basic reorientation of the country .
There has been a dramatic discovery and development of resources, primarily oil and gas, in the last ten years . The direct importance of the area economi cally to Europe has expanded .
All of this has brought a very basic change in the relationship between North Africa and the United States .
Except for the use of com munications facilities at one Moroccan base, we no longer have any military facilities in North Africa.
The proposition of economic assistance provided by the United States has steadily declined as European countries have assumed a larger share .
U.S. grant military assistance
T
and military involvement have de clined substantially .
Our relationship with the
leadership is changing. The gen eration has passed or is passing which recalls our initial help to the newly independent countries.
This change happened early in Algeria where the original leaders of the FLN ( National Liberation Front ) whom we had known
were replaced by those we did not know . In Libya , those who recognized and welcomed our help to that country in its early years have been replaced ; both the present prosperity and the changed circumstances have ob
literated recollections of that earlier relationship.
Where there has been an ab
rupt change in a country in which we had close relations with the previous regime, we
have had the added element of suspicions regarding our inten tions on the part of the new leaders. Only time can overcome such feelings .
The last decade, further, has seen climactic events in the Near East which have affected our own relationships. Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us; rela tions with the other three na tions of the area became difficult in the months immediately fol lowing the 1967 war. The belief that we had helped Israel to win the six -day war died hard . While these nations may not have been directly involved in the fighting , they were committed as Arabs and shared the feelings of humili ation and bitterness over these events . The Near Eastern issues remain a serious, but not insur mountable , problem in our rela
tions with North African coun tries.
In 1971 , we have new interests and requirements. For the first time in our peacetime history , we face shortages of significant resources. One of them is natural
gas . In Washington, D.C. , early in November 1971 , the local gas utility announced it could take no more new commercial customers;
there was simply not enough gas. North Africa-and particularly Algeria- has large gas reserves.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD
NORTH AFRICA
Our approach to North Africa in these circumstances is based on certain clear assumptions :
- First, North Africa remains important to us as an area . We
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3
have a keen interest in the free dom of the Mediterranean and in the continued access for all to that sea and to the nations around it . The establishment of dominant foreign influences ad versely affecting these interests on the southern shore of the Mediterranean would be a matter of grave concern to us.
-Secondly, the orderly de velopment of these nations and their resources is important to them, to Europe, and to us.
While there are, and will con tinue to be, differing views on what constitutes a reasonable basis for access to these re sources, there is agreement that such access is important to all .
- Thirdly, we shall remain an important source of the capital and technology required for the development of this area . The nature of arrangements may change, but the U.S. private role is likely to continue.
- Fourthly, the nations of North Africa , despite policies shaped by different histories and influences, will all stoutly resist domination byby any outside power. They will defy simple categorization in any East -West lineup.
- Finally, events in North Africa , as in many other parts of the world , will move today with far less concern over the role of the United States and reference to us than in years past. If we have interests there, it is our task to preserve them, whether it be in investment, in trade, or in security. We cannot assume that others will do it for us.
Against the background of these assumptions, what is our approach to these nations today ? We regard them, first , not as
4
pawns in an international game, but as independent, sovereign nations. We seek relations with them based on mutual interest, independent of their relations with others. We recognize and respect the variety among the nations. The Cold War is over unless others choose to continue it . As the President said in his report to the Congress on foreign policy in February 1970, “ United States Foreign Policy for the 70's ," one of our two major concerns in Africa is " that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form. This is even more in Africa's interest than ours."
BILATERAL RELATIONS
Morocco
We have had particularly close ties with Morocco and Tunisia . Despite the withdrawal of mil itary facilities from Morocco, our economic and strategic interests there remain substantial. We re tain important Voice of America facilities. We have growing trade with Morocco and our invest ment there is also increasing . We value the presence of this friend at the southern side of the gate
way to the Mediterranean . Morocco has , since independ ence, faced severe economic problems. We have helped in the development of its agriculture and in meeting problems of em ployment.
King Hassan, thrust suddenly into power in 1961 , has led Morocco skillfully through criti cal years and critical problems.
We have both benefited from cooperation . Our relationship with Morocco, however, has
given us neither the right nor the capability to determine the course of Moroccan political or economic life, even if we had desired to do so .
In foreign policy, too , King Hassan has followed an inde pendent course . He has , over the years, improved his relations with Europe and has established friendly relations with the Soviet Union . He has taken an active role in Arab affairs and has fre quently used his relationship with us to bring to our attention Arab concerns.
Neither in Morocco-nor in any other developing country do we seek to further or support any particular system or foreign policy. We feel that both are the responsibility of the peoples of the country.
We have established a mutual ly beneficial relationship with Morocco, despite the different nature of our systems of govern ment. We find a common interest in continuing Moroccan eco nomic growth and the continued absence in Morocco of influences hostile to our basic concerns. In the area of economic develop ment, we have no magic formu lae to guarantee growth either for ourselves or for the Moroc cans. Only the Moroccans, them selves, can assure their own progress - political, economic, and social . We believe, however, that our assistance has improved their ability to make such progress.
Tunisia
Tunisia exemplifies a smaller country , ably governed by re sponsible leadership possessing influence beyond its borders, but endowed with modest natural
resources.
The United States has enjoyed 15 years of very close relations with Tunisia and has contributed a very significant amount of eco nomic assistance - well over $600 million since 1956. We have no alliance with Tunisia , no bases there, and no real strategic inter est in that country. U.S. invest ment is minimal ( approximately $ 12.9 million in FY 1970 ) . Yet U.S. policy over the years has been marked by strong support for Tunisia's economic and polit ical independence.
The United States was one of the first governments to recog nize Tunisia in 1956. Our assist ance followed the 1961 decision that Tunisia should be one of the countries to receive a long-term commitment since it possessed the infrastructure, sufficient economic potential , and political will to serve as a model for other developing countries .
Despite this commitment and interest in Tunisia's success , we did not attempt to determine the path Tunisia chose for de velopment. It is difficult to con ceive of a leader of President Bourguiba's character permitting such interference if it had been tried . Tunisian successes and errors are their own. There were misgivings within the U.S. Gov ernment in 1966-1969 during the period of accelerated expansion of agricultural cooperatives and increased state control over the Tunisian economy. It was agreed ,
however, that the Tunisian ex periment was worthy of our con tinued support. Tunisia's ensuing decision in 1969 to reverse the course of its economic policy to give greater emphasis to private enterprise and free market forces
was entirely a Tunisian determi nation.
As a result of the farsighted reforms of President Bourguiba , Tunisia is , in social terms, still the most advanced of the Arab states . Its human resources are its greatest wealth and we will con tinue to be interested in its de velopment and well - being.
Tunisia has always had an in dependent foreign policy. It con tinues to do so . As its leadership passes into other hands, we look for a continuation of our close relationship, one based essen tially on a common interest in Tunisia's development.
In both Morocco and Tunisia , however, the basic U.S. role has changed in the past ten years. Economic assistance is flowing to both countries from more sources and the overall U.S. share has declined . Tunisia has been one of the models of the multi lateral approach in which a Con sultative Group, under the aegis of the World Bank , has, for a number of years , coordinated the international effort.
French aid to Tunisia has held Steady in real terms and aid to Morocco has increased in both real and proportionate terms.
U.S. aid has declined absolutely and proportionately in both countries.
Between 1960 and 1964 , the U.S. provided two- thirds of all non-Communist economic aid to Morocco and Tunisia. Between 1965 and 1969 , this proportion declined to 42 percent of the aid flowing to each . In 1970, the U.S. share dropped still further as other donors have increased their share . Our decreasing share is a reflection of the progress these countries are making, and
of the widening responsibility being assumed by other na tions-a trend entirely consistent with overall AID policy.
Algeria
Our relations with independ ent Algeria have been quite dif ferent from those with Morocco and Tunisia .
If we go back to 1962, U.S. expectations about the potential benefits of bilateral relations with Algeria were probably higher than with most other newly independent countries.
They were probably unrealistic at that time given our inexperi ence in dealing with each other. President Kennedy had felt a special interest in Algeria dating from his 1957 speech urging that country's independence. The Algerian leader, Ben Bella, had flown back to North Africa, fol lowing his release by the French , in a U.S. Air Force plane. His first foreign visit as President after Algerian independence was to the United Nations and Wash ington where he was received by President Kennedy. The fact that Ben Bella chose to proceed di rectly from Washington to Cuba was perhaps an omen of what was to come.
The Algerians for their part always held a strong ideological bias against the United States. They identified the United States with France through NATO. Conversely, they felt a deep bond of sympathy with those states which had endorsed and supported the long, bitter Alger ian war of independence against France: North Viet- Nam, Egypt, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba-all countries with
5
which , in varying degrees, the United States was at odds. In this environment of suspicion and hostility , and given the instabil ity and rivalries of the Ben Bella period , it is not difficult to un derstand the lack of rapport. Even the fact that the United States supplied some $ 165 mil lion of PL-480 foodstuffs be tween 1962 and 1967 was re garded by the Algerians as a minor recompense for the devas tation suffered during their in dependence struggle.
The overthrow of Ben Bella on June 19, 1965 , by Minister of Defense Houari Boumedienne re vived briefly U.S. hopes that satisfactory relations might be possible. Boumedienne's serious approach and his announced in tention to concentrate on his country's problems seemed to augur well for such a develop ment.
With the six- day war, however, Algeria broke diplomatic rela tions, and all U.S. aid to Algeria ceased by law. At the same time , Algeria seized almost all U.S. firms operating there , principally oil companies.
In retrospect, the break in relations proved to have had some benefits. For one thing it cleared the air . The romantic view of the prospects for U.S. Algerian relations vanished over night. We recognized that mutual confidence would not be based solely on aid programs, however well- intentioned , nor on public gestures of support, however sin cere.
The subsequent upturn in U.S. - Algerian relations has been
marked by several turning points. One was the emergence of Presi dent Boumedienne as the undis
6
puted leader of Algeria . He focused his government's efforts on domestic economic develop ment and , in the pursuit of rapid industrialization the Algerians found they wanted the expertise and technology that private American enterprise could sup ply. Many U.S. firms responded to the indication that they would be welcome.
Another major turning point was the October 1969 agreement between SONATRACH, the State oil company, and the El Paso Natural Gas Company for the sale of one billion cubic feet- per- day of natural gas in liquefied form for importation to the U.S. east coast. This project and others like it represent a natural arrangement between the United States , with its estimated annual shortfall in gas supply of 35 trillion cubic feet by 1980 , and Algeria with the fourth largest proven, and largely un committed , gas reserves in the world- 130 trillion cubic feet.
But given the past history of U.S.- Algerian relations, and Algeria's treatment of U.S. petro leum companies, the huge amounts of capital needed , and the respective government au thorizations required , it was clear even in 1969 that to bring these projects to fruition would be no easy task . If they could be imple mented, however-and there is cause for optimism that they will be - they would create the most significant long- term economic links between the United States and North Africa in history . They would make a substantial contribution to Algeria's eco nomic development and reduce Algeria's dependence on foreign
governments for t development financing.
During the past two years both governments have, in a spirit of businesslike coopera tion , taken actions to enhance the possibilities for an early reali zation of these Liquefied Natural Gas ( LNG ) projects. Algeria has upgraded and strengthened its diplomatic representation in Washington-still under the flag of Guinea-and we have done likewise in Algiers under the Swiss flag . Algeria has resolved all but one of its expropriation disputes with U.S. companies.
The Export- Import Bank has in formed SONATRACH that it is prepared to consider favorably the financing of several hundred million dollars of U.S. exports for the construction of the neces sary facilities in Algeria for this project. The American com panies will make no investment in Algeria, but they will finance the Liquefied Natural Gas tankers. The final authorization by the U.S. Federal Power Com mission-which will set impor tant precedents for the LNG industry-is the one remaining requirement.
Libya
U.S. relations with Libya over the past 29 years have gone through the same radical trans formations as the country itself .
In the pre - oil , pre- military - coup period , Libya was considered one of the most disinherited of the developing countries and showed little promise of economic viabil ity . In the early 1950's, Libya was dependent on U.S. , U.K. ,
and other foreign aid for its economic development and mili
tary assistance. Libya concluded a defense agreement with the United Kingdom , and agreed to the establishment of Wheelus Air Force Base outside Tripoli and a British air base near Tobruk.
Wheelus, because of its ideal cli matic conditions, became the principal training base for U.S. fighter aircraft stationed in Western Europe .
This close relationship , which was clearly one of Libyan eco nomic dependence on the United States and the United Kingdom,
was obviously headed for change when, in December 1957 , Esso became the first oil company to announce it had struck oil . By 1968 , Libya had become one of the world's leading oil producers and the per capita GNP of its 1.6 million inhabitants had increased from about $ 100 at independ
ence to $ 1,640. Reflecting this transformation, assistance
our
program was ended in 1965 .
In Libya, the United States faced in a very special way the problem of identification with a regime. We had provided substan tial financial support in the early days of the kingdom. We enjoyed the benefits of military facilities.
There was a widespread-but un founded - belief that the British and American Ambassadors dic tated policies to Libyan Govern ments.
There was much less awareness of the growing concern of Ameri can representatives in Libya at the increasing detachment of the King from events in the country, the influence of some of those around the King on policies and ,
what was particularly serious, the disenchantment of many of the best young men in the country
with the lack of progress in the building of modern institutions. It is conceivable that the United States could have had a significant influence on the course of events in Libya , but this must remain in the realm of speculation. Our aid had helped launch the country. The King and many of its leaders felt an indebtedness to the United
States. Yet, it was clear to American officials serving in Libya during those years that the course of events was in Libyan hands and would be determined by Libyans. Neither an earlier withdrawal of our facilities from Libya nor the exercise of any extraordinary influence in that country could likely have changed the basic direction of events.
It was particularly regrettable, but not at all surprising , that the leaders of the coup of September 1969 , under Lieutenant ( now Colonel ) Qadhafi , took power with deep suspicions of the United States and with serious expectations that we would try to oppose their coup. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the new regime , deeply influenced by the frustration of the young Arab military officers over the course of the six - day war, made the Arab struggle against Israel a principal tenet of its foreign policy. Their belief in our unqualified support for Israel remains today the chief obstacle to better relations. Other suspi cions have, in all probability ,
been modified .
We adapted quickly to the change in Libya. It was never our intention to do otherwise . We agreed to the evacuation of our air base near Tripoli and our
Coast Guard navigation station in the Gulf of Sirte . We modified the nature of our relationship to meet the new situation .
In Libya today, the greatest U.S. interests are, in a sense, beyond the government domain. The investment and activities of private American companies in the development and production of Libya's vast oil reserves are essentially matters between the companies and Libya. Our role when we have a role-is to seek to explain wider aspects of inter national relations which may bear on oil policy . In the 1970 negotiations, for example, our official effort was confined to
explaining our primary concerns as a government over the conse quences for the consuming na tions of any break down in nego tiations, and to explaining actions taken by the U.S. Gov ernment in permitting the com panies to concert on negotia tions.
Today the 11 - nation Organiza tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC ) , consisting of Algeria , Iran , Iraq , Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Venezuela , Libya , Qatar, Abu Dhabi , Indonesia , and
Nigeria , are in a strong position as a result of the world energy outlook . Demand for oil and gas by the developed world is ex panding by leaps and bounds.
The OPEC countries have that oil and gas, far in excess of their own needs. A great amount of creative diplomacy by govern ments and business alike is going to be required if the demands of the producing countries for in creasing revenues and for control of the companies are to be met without disrupting the industry,
the consumers, and the econo 7
mies of the producing countries themselves. Libya will be a major driving force among the OPEC countries.
It can be asked , in retrospect, what were the benefits we gained from our substantial assistance to Libya in its early days ?
First , we must recall the strong efforts made by the Soviet Union in those days to have established a Soviet trusteeship over the former Italian colony of Tripolitania . Our help to Libya enabled it to emerge and survive as an independent nation . This gave us advantages in access to and the utilization of key facili ties during critical years fol lowing World War II . It provided a base on which the Libyans and private American firms could build the important petroleum industry that exists in that country today.
8
Events have moved. Circum stances have changed. We have changed with them . We should not regret what has gone before,
for that was important to where we are today . And today's Libya has a leadership with which we still have problems, but it is an independent leadership providing no more of an opportunity to other non - Arab forces than it provides to us.
LONG- RANGE VIEW
North Africa is a significant area of the world, at the hub where Europe, Africa , and the Middle East meet. It lies on our route of access to southern Europe and the eastern Mediter ranean . It is a significant source of energy for Europe and will increasingly become so for us. It
UNIVERSITY OFMINNESOTA
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is an example of the trends and problems of the developing world generally.
We have, without forgetting our friends, adapted to change in North Africa . We see its nations as individual entities, each with unique characteristics, deter mining its own future and its own policies. We see our rela tions with them as important to our own interests . We can pre serve those interests so long as we are prepared to continue an active role in the area and to find foundations for our relationships built genuinely on common in terests.
Department of State Publication 8622 African Series 51
Released January 1972
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20420 - Price 10 cents
# U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1972 486-391 / 13