rational number

[mosaadabd460]

44
perseverance, and fortitude of the troops. Communications were
so poor that food and ammunition had to be carried by burros over
difficult winding trails. However, the attacks were successful, and
by 1 May the Germans had been driven back to the eastern slopes
of the last hills—those that overlook the Mateur plain and Lake
Achkel.
By this date it was evident that the Germans opposite the II Corps
were in a critical situation. In the south the main effort had opened
the Tine valley corridor to Mateur, while in the north the enemy
was threatened with an envelopment of his right flank.
To avoid disaster, the Germans made a general withdrawal on the
night of 1-2 May and the following day. South of Lake Achkel they
took up a position that, if held, would protect Tebourba and the
Tunis plain. North of the lake they prepared for a last-ditch stand
in the hills bordering the main road to Bizerte.
No time was lost by the II Corps in following the retreating Gerï؟¾mans. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to advance northï؟¾eastward from the Tine valley, and it entered Mateur at 1100 hours
on 3 May. This rapid movement threatened to disrupt all the Gerï؟¾man plans. Now an American attack to the east or northeast from
Mateur might effect a breakthrough that would cut off the Axis
/ forces in the Bizerte area from those in the vicinity of Tunis. Enemy
planes, armor, infantry, and artillery were rushed to the threatened
sector in an effort to prevent the 1st Armored Division from adï؟¾vancing beyond Mateur.
In the fighting through 3 May the II Corps had taken Mateur, its
first major prize of the campaign, had prevented von Arnim from
concentrating to meet the British drive down the Medjerda valley,
and, in addition, had threatened the disruption of the entire Axis
right wing. The stage was set in the north for the final battle of
the campaign.
Final Drive, 3-13 May 1943.—Since 22 April the Allied forces had
made limited advances on all fronts, but at no point had a breakï؟¾through been achieved. Therefore, it was clear to General Alexï؟¾ander that additional large-scale infantry attacks would have to be
made. The best prospects seemed to be offered in the Medjez area,
where the successful attacks on Longstop Hill had resulted in clearï؟¾ing enemy strong points north of the Medjerda River. So it was
decided not to continue with the armored attack in the Goubellat
area, but rather to concentrate all available forces for a final decisive
drive on Tunis from Medjez el Bab.