rational number

[mosaadabd460]

3
to divert Axis attention from the newly selected theater of opera￾tions, and, subsequently, the British Eighth Army was to constitute
the eastern jaw of the pincers designed to crush all Axis opposition
in Africa. So the plans for the invasion were continued despite the
apparently adverse situation in Egypt.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
It appeared that the following strategic advantages would accrue
from the occupation of French North Africa:
1. The first advantage would be the clearing of the Mediterranean
supply route. Allied convoys would be able to move along it under
the protection of land-based aircraft. They could reach Egypt and
the Suez Canal by a sea route that is 2300 miles long (measured
from Gibraltar), or 10,000 miles less than that around the Cape of
Good Hope. The distance from the United Kingdom to India and
to our newly established Persian Gulf Command would also be
greatly shortened.
2. The occupation of French North Africa would make the block￾ade of the Axis powers virtually complete. All shipments of food
and other supplies from Africa to Germany and her satellites would
cease.
3. Another possible route for the invasion of continental Europe
would be secured, thereby forcing the Germans to withdraw troops
from the Russian front to defend this invasion route.
4. The control of French North Africa by the Allies would make
Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East safe from an invasion
from the west.
5. Dakar would no longer be a threat to South America.
6. If the occupation of French North Africa could be carried out
without fatally embittering the French troops and authorities in
that region, it would make possible the reconstitution of the French
Army in preparation for its return in force to the homeland.
However, the Allied forces were faced with many problems which,
if aggravated, might seriously impair the success of the operation.
The reaction of Spain and Vichy France, and of French North Af￾rica itself, would have a vital bearing on coming events. Axis air￾fields in Sicily and Sardinia enabled the enemy to dominate that
section of the Mediterranean between Tunisia and Italy and pro￾hibited the successful movement of Allied convoys through this area,
known as “bomb alley.” Since Spain herself was pro-Axis, there
was a real danger that the Germans would strike through that coun-