‘Morsi is my president’

[مستر محمد سلام]

‘Morsi is my president’



The Turkish prime minister’s recent outburst in support of Egypt’s ousted president is an attempt to distract attention from his own growing authoritarianism, writes Sayed Abdel-Maguid in Ankara

Wonders will never cease! Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan turns out to be an even more fervent supporter of ousted former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi than the members of Morsi’s own Muslim Brotherhood.

So jested quite a few Turkish commentators, some of whom suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood should now confer a medal of honour on the Turkish prime minister, since the organisation was unlikely to find a more faithful and dedicated supporter outside its ranks, they maintained.

It would be no exaggeration to say that a broad segment of Turkish public opinion was stunned when they heard their prime minister say that he “did not see any other president in Egypt than Mohamed Morsi, who was elected by his people” last week.

“What do the Turks have to do with the business in Egypt that does not even concern them,” was the immediate reaction of many. They were even more shocked to learn that Erdogan was apparently convinced that the 33 million people who had filled the streets and squares of Egypt on 30 June were no more than an electronic illusion manufactured by the fiendish masters of the “accursed Twitter”, as he put it in his remarks.

The Turks were then treated to a sermon, following a Ramadan breakfast banquet on Saturday, in which Erdogan offered a prayer to God “to lead the minority who are sitting in Tahrir Square”. He was confident that “they would soon learn the truth, and when they do they will join the march beneath the banner of constitutional legitimacy along with their fellow believers at the Rabaa Al-Adawiya Mosque” in Cairo, Erdogan said.

To be fair, Erdogan is not the sole pro-Morsi champion in Turkey, even if his ardour in this cause are hard to match, part of a surrealistic campaign that seems completely detached from reality, including realities in Turkey itself.

In response to a wink of approval from the powers-that-be in Ankara, the Islamist-oriented Saadet (Felicity) Party founded by the late Necmettin Erbakan organised a pro-Morsi demonstration in Istanbul on Sunday during which thousands responded to the party’s call to “rally in opposition to the coup and in support of Egypt”.

Demonstrators assembled near walls dating back to the Byzantine era to shout “We’re with you Morsi!” and “We’re all Muslims and we’re all brothers.” Some chants booed Egyptian General Al-Sisi who, in the opinion of the Turkish demonstrators, had been responsible for “overthrowing” the millions who had voted for Morsi in the Egyptian presidential elections last year.

Naturally, the Turkish media was on hand to cover the event, this being a predominantly cowed and domesticated media that knows it had better keep its lenses focused exclusively on the vicinity of Rabaa Al-Adawiya and ignore anything that might send a conflicting message to Turkish audiences.

Of course, Erdogan’s pro-Morsi zeal also has a strong domestic motive. In the course of justifying the recourse to excessive force against the protesters in Taksim Square and other Turkish squares opposed to his policies, he famously said that he had “come to power through the polls” and would not leave by any other means than the polls.

It is little wonder, then, that Erdogan’s rhetoric against the Tamarod (Rebel) Movement in Egypt has homed in on the imperative of bowing to the legitimacy of the ballot box. Only the results of this reflect the will of the people, in his view, and confer authority on the winning party, and only the result of the polls can determine whether the government formed by the ruling party is successful or not.

The tenacity with which Erdogan has adhered to this line has set Ankara’s compass with respect to events in Egypt. Although the Turkish Foreign Ministry has indicated the possibility of moderation, it is clear that the prime minister is determined to escalate his campaign against Cairo and to mentally block out the causes and repercussions of the second wave of the 25 January Revolution that took place two-and-a-half years ago.

While Erdogan’s remark that “Morsi is my president” elicited sarcastic smiles among intellectuals, commentators and observers in Egypt, Ankara’s actions toward Egypt, which have flouted the most basic diplomatic codes and conventions, have also prompted concerns.

What is the Erdogan government trying to do, commentators have asked. Is the purpose to strain Turkish-Egyptian relations to the breaking point? And will the media campaign now being engineered by Turkish deputy prime minister Bÿlent Arõnç subdue such anxieties?

Meanwhile, the Turkish dailies as well as informed observers in Istanbul have observed that the new authorities in Cairo have shown considerable self-restraint and have been working hard to mend the rift with decision-makers in Ankara, aiming to persuade them that the Egyptian army acted solely in response to the overwhelming popular will.

But there is another important domestic factor that has shaped the Anatolian response to events in Egypt. On Saturday, the Turkish parliament approved an amendment intended to definitively clip the Turkish army’s political wings.

Article 35 of an army regulation that had once defined the role of the army as being “to safeguard the Turkish republic” has often been cited by Turkish generals as giving legal grounds for carrying out a coup if they felt that the government of the day was undermining republican principles, such as secularism. This article has now been reworded to read that the army’s role is “to defend the Turkish nation against external threats and dangers”.

Against a backdrop of anti-government protests at home, the amendment, introduced by Erdogan’s ruling party, was meant to deliver an explicit message to Turkish army officers and soldiers: “don’t even begin to think of emulating what your Egyptian counterparts have done.”

At the same time, the Erdogan government has strengthened the powers of the police. This, after all, is the force that it will task with suppressing protest demonstrations against what the opposition already regards as Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism and his government’s stealthy assault on civil and personal freedoms.

When the academic year begins this autumn, the police will take the place of private security firms on university campuses, for example. The action is an explicit response to the nationwide anti-government demonstrations that flared up after a sit-in, whose original purpose was to protect Gezi Park in Taksim Square, was attacked by the police. The Gezi Park demonstrations were primarily led by university students.

Justifying his decision to move the police onto Turkish university campuses, Erdogan said that “we don’t want to see our youth walking around carrying Molotov cocktails and knives.” His point, of course, was to blame his youthful critics for the violence and then to tell them that his government had improved conditions for students so they had better show their gratitude and stop protesting.
Will the students listen? It seems unlikely, judging by the amounts of tear gas and water canons recently brought to bear in Turkish cities to disperse large crowds of demonstrators every Saturday and Sunday, while an obedient media kept its attention focussed elsewher